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THE FEDERAL RULES OF INMATE APPEALS 
Catherine T. Struve* 
ABSTRACT 
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure turn fifty in 2018. During the 
rules’ half-century of existence, the number of federal appeals by self-
represented, incarcerated litigants has grown dramatically. This article 
surveys ways in which the procedure for inmate appeals has evolved over the 
past fifty years, and examines the challenges of designing procedures with 
confined litigants in mind. In the initial decades under the Appellate Rules, 
the most visible developments concerning the procedure for inmate appeals 
arose from the interplay between court decisions and the federal rulemaking 
process. But, as court dockets swelled, the circuits also developed local case 
management practices that significantly affect inmate appeals. And, in the 
1990s, Congress enacted legislation that produced major changes in inmate 
litigation, including inmate appeals. In the coming years, the most notable 
new driver of change in the procedure for inmate appeals may be the advent 
of opportunities for electronic court filing within prisons. That nascent 
development illustrates the ways in which the particulars of procedure in 
inmate appeals are shaped by systems in prisons, jails, and other facilities—
and underscores the salience of local court practices and institutional 
partnerships. 
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The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure turn fifty in 2018. During the 
rules’ half-century of existence, the number of people incarcerated in the 
United States shot upwards, and with the growing prison population came 
corresponding growth in federal lawsuits by inmates—both lawsuits 
challenging confinement itself and lawsuits challenging the conditions of that 
confinement. As a result, the number of federal appeals by self-represented, 
incarcerated litigants has increased dramatically. From the first discussions 
of the proposed Appellate Rules, the appellate procedures for inmate 
litigation presented distinctive issues that received attention from the 
rulemakers—and, later, from the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, and 
Congress. 
Surprisingly, academics generally have not shared that interest. Though a 
few notes and articles have examined the rules governing the timeliness of 
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inmate filings,1 the nature of statutory constraints on inmate appeals,2 or the 
permission required when inmates seek to appeal the denial of their requests 
for postconviction review,3 this article appears to be the first to provide an 
overview of the procedural features distinctive to inmate appeals in federal 
court.4 Moreover, this article appears to be the first to describe and assess 
initiatives for electronic filing by incarcerated litigants.5 
In the parts that follow, I survey ways in which the procedure for inmate 
appeals has evolved over the past fifty years, and I examine the challenges of 
                                                                                                                            
 1. Three publications have focused on aspects of the “prison mailbox rule” (which I discuss 
in Part I of this article). See Sara A. Harris, Pettibone v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and 
Parole: The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania Extends the “Prisoner Mailbox Rule” to Pro 
Se Administrative Appeals Filed with the Board of Probation and Parole, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 
329, 329–30 (2002); Courtenay Canedy, Comment, The Prison Mailbox Rule and Passively 
Represented Prisoners, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 773, 787 (2009); Eric D. Kelderman, Note, 
Fairness in Habeas Petition Filings for Pro Se Prisoners: The Propriety of the Eighth Circuit’s 
Holding in Nichols v. Bowersox, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 359, 402 (2000). 
 2. Two publications address the application, to appeals, of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (“PLRA”)’s limits on attorney fees. See Maxwell Murtaugh, Note, The PLRA’s Dividing 
Language: Statutory Interpretation and Applying the Attorney’s Fees Cap at the Appellate Level, 
59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 219, 224 (2014); Peter Shakro, Note, Inmates Who Cried Wolf: The Dangers 
of Applying the PLRA’s Limit on Appellate Attorney’s Fees in Prisoner Deprivation of Rights 
Claims, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 169, 176–78 (2014). I address other aspects of the PLRA in Part 
II.B. 
 3. Some articles address the certificates of appealability (“COAs”) required of inmate 
appellants in habeas or § 2255 appeals—a topic that I treat in Part II.B.1. See, e.g., Christopher 
Q. Cutler, Friendly Habeas Reform—Reconsidering a District Court’s Threshold Role in the 
Appellate Habeas Process, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 281, 359 (2007); David Goodwin, An 
Appealing Choice: An Analysis of and a Proposal for Certificates of Appealability in 
“Procedural” Habeas Appeals, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 791, 796 (2013); Ryan Hagglund, 
Review and Vacatur of Certificates of Appealability Issued After the Denial of Habeas Corpus 
Petitions, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 989, 990 (2005); Jonah J. Horwitz, Certifiable: Certificates of 
Appealability, Habeas Corpus, and the Perils of Self-Judging, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
695, 699 (2012); Margaret A. Upshaw, Comment, The Unappealing State of Certificates of 
Appealability, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (2015). 
 4. For an excellent treatise that includes a segment on appellate procedure, see JOHN 
BOSTON & DANIEL E. MANVILLE, PRISONERS’ SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL 752–66 (4th ed. 
2010). Empirical work concerning habeas appeals and concerning inmate litigation in the district 
courts provides useful context for my analysis. See generally Nancy J. King, Non-Capital Habeas 
Cases After Appellate Review: An Empirical Analysis, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 308 (2012); Margo 
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003) [hereinafter Schlanger, Inmate 
Litigation]; Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153 (2015) [hereinafter Schlanger, Adulthood]. And Part II.A draws upon 
the work of Professor Marin Levy concerning circuit case management practices. See generally 
Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the 
Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315 (2011). 
 5. A search in WestlawNext’s “JLR” database for (“electronic filing” “e-filing” “efiling”) 
/s (prison! inmate correctional jail incarcerat!) yielded a few results that briefly mentioned the 
topic, but yielded no articles that focused on it. 
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designing procedures for use by confined litigants. Part I observes that, in the 
initial decades under the Appellate Rules, the most visible developments 
concerning the procedure for inmate appeals arose from the interplay between 
court decisions and the federal rulemaking process. Part II.A notes the subtler 
but no less important effect of the circuits’ creation, from the 1970s forward, 
of case management practices designed to address the courts’ burgeoning 
dockets. In the 1990s, as I recount in Part II.B, Congress enacted legislation 
that produced major changes in inmate litigation, including inmate appeals. 
In the coming years, the most notable new driver of change in the procedure 
for inmate appeals may be the advent of opportunities for electronic court 
filing within prisons. That nascent development, which I discuss in Part III, 
illustrates the ways in which the particulars of procedure in inmate appeals 
are shaped by systems in prisons, jails, and other facilities—and underscores 
the salience of local court practices and institutional partnerships. 
Local variation—among prisons and jails and across time when an inmate 
is transferred among institutions—will pose challenges for national rules that 
seek to account for the particulars of inmate filing. As the national rules adapt 
to changing practices in courts, prisons, and jails, the flexible approach 
embedded in the original Appellate Rules will retain continuing importance. 
I. COURT-RULEMAKER DIALOGUES DURING THE EARLY YEARS 
The Appellate Rules were created during the 1960s—a decade when the 
rights of prisoners were the subject of close attention both inside and outside 
the courts. That attention, I will argue in Part I.A, affected the drafting of 
provisions in the Appellate Rules that shaped the procedures for inmate 
appeals. The evidence I review in Part I.A suggests that the drafters of the 
original Appellate Rules sought, in a number of ways, to promote the goal of 
equal access to appellate justice for poor and incarcerated litigants. 
Meanwhile, the Warren Court era saw the start of a rise in inmate litigation 
that continued during the ensuing decades. The Appellate Rules’ first quarter-
century in existence witnessed not only inmate litigation’s growth in scope 
and salience but also the adoption, first by the Court and then by the 
rulemakers, of filing provisions tailored specifically to the circumstances of 
inmate litigants (what I will call the “prison mailbox rule”). Part I.B recounts 
the development of the prison mailbox rule (and notes debate over the 
boundaries of its coverage). 
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A. The Original Appellate Rules and the Goal of Equal Access 
It is well known that that the drafters of the original Appellate Rules 
sought to bring uniformity to practice in the federal courts of appeals. Less 
attention has been given to the contributions those drafters made in areas of 
practice affecting inmate filers. As originally adopted, the text of the 
Appellate Rules explicitly addressed inmate appeals in Title VI, which 
covered habeas proceedings (Rules 22 and 23)6 and proceedings in forma 
pauperis (Rule 24).7 The adoption of that Title was an innovation, given 
that—at the time—the Civil and Criminal Rules addressed in forma pauperis 
filings only glancingly and given that the national rules governing habeas and 
§ 2255 proceedings had not yet been promulgated. Interestingly, both state-
prisoner habeas cases and appeals in forma pauperis were envisioned as 
falling within the general provisions for “appeals as of right” (Rules 3 and 
4)8—even though statutes already imposed some constraints on the “right” of 
the appellant to proceed in such cases. That classification, I will argue below, 
may have reflected not merely existing practice but also the Warren Court’s 
perspective on the process to be accorded to poor and incarcerated litigants. 
The early- and mid-1960s were a time when the Supreme Court, the 
executive branch, and Congress all took measures to improve the treatment 
of poor defendants in the criminal justice system. One contemporary 
commentator highlighted 
a sequence of six decisions rendered on successive opinion days [in] 
1963 [that] significantly expanded the rights under the fourteenth 
amendment of impoverished persons accused or convicted of crime. 
Of the six cases, three—Lynumn v. Illinois, Gideon v. Wainwright 
and Bush v. Texas—involved pretrial or trial stages, and three—
Draper v. Washington, Lane v. Brown, and Douglas v. California—
involved appeal.9 
Draper and Lane addressed the right of indigent defendants to have 
transcripts for purposes of direct appeals or appeals from the denial of 
                                                                                                                            
 6. See FED. R. APP. P. 22 (1967) (last amended in 2009); id. 23 (1967) (last amended in 
1998). 
 7. See id. 24 (1967) (last amended in 2013). 
 8. See id. 3 (1967) (last amended in 1998); id. 4 (1967) (last amended in 2017). 
 9. Harold W. Solomon, “This New Fetish for Indigency”: Justice and Poverty in an 
Affluent Society, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 248 (1966) (footnotes omitted). 
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postconviction review,10 while Douglas struck down a state’s pre-screening 
practice for limiting appointment of appellate counsel.11 
Meanwhile, in 1961, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy had appointed 
a committee “to study the system of federal criminal justice with the purpose 
of identifying problems faced by persons of limited means charged with 
federal crimes and problems created for the system of federal justice by the 
presence of such persons in its courts.”12 That committee—the Attorney 
General’s Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal 
Justice (also called the Allen Committee because it was chaired by Professor 
Francis Allen)13—issued a report in 1963 that made recommendations on a 
number of topics, including “appeals procedure, representation of appellants 
on appeal, and provision of trial transcripts for impoverished defendants 
seeking appellate review of their convictions.”14 The Report in turn played a 
role in Congress’s enactment of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,15 which 
required each district to adopt a plan for providing representation to indigent 
defendants, and each circuit to adopt plans for providing representation to 
such defendants on appeal.16 For its part, the Department of Justice took 
action “suggested by the Allen Committee to improve [the DOJ’s] own use 
of discretionary prosecutorial powers.”17 
Unsurprisingly, this concern for indigent litigants—and particularly for 
indigent criminal defendants—also surfaced in the rulemaking process, and I 
will argue that it underpinned a number of facets of the new Appellate Rules. 
To set the stage, I first review, in Part I.A.1, the landscape of habeas and in 
forma pauperis appeals at the time that the rules were drafted. 
                                                                                                                            
 10. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498–500 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 
477, 480–81 (1963). Both Draper and Lane built on precedents from the preceding decade. See 
Draper, 372 U.S. at 488–89 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956), and Eskridge v. 
Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958)); Lane, 372 U.S. at 483–
84 (same); see also Solomon, supra note 9, at 249 (discussing Draper and Lane). 
 11. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355, 357–58 (1963); see also Solomon, supra 
note 9, at 249 (discussing Douglas). 
 12. ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON POVERTY & THE ADMIN. OF FED. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (1963) [hereinafter ALLEN COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 13. See Geoffrey T. Cheshire, A History of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, FED. LAW., 
Mar. 2013, at 46, 52, https://cjastudy.fd.org/sites/default/files/public-
resources/History%20of%20the%20Criminal%20Justice%20Act%20of%201964_0.pdf (noting 
that the Committee “was dubbed the ‘Allen Committee’ after its chair, University of Michigan 
Law School Professor Francis A. Allen”). 
 14. ALLEN COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 4. 
 15. See Solomon, supra note 9, at 249–50. 
 16. See Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, § 2, 78 Stat. 552, 552–54. 
 17. Solomon, supra note 9, at 250. 
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1. Habeas and In Forma Pauperis Appeals in the Late 1960s 
At the time of the adoption of the Appellate Rules, there were two 
overlapping classes of litigants whose right to take an “appeal as of right” 
might be thought to be qualified rather than absolute. State prisoners were 
required to obtain a “certificate of probable cause” in order to appeal a 
judgment denying habeas relief.18 As the Supreme Court would later state, 
“Congress established the requirement that a prisoner obtain a certificate of 
probable cause to appeal in order to prevent frivolous appeals from delaying 
the States’ ability to impose sentences, including death sentences.”19 And 
litigants too poor to pay the filing fee could appeal only if they qualified to 
proceed in forma pauperis (i.e., as a poor person).20 By the time of the drafting 
of the Appellate Rules, the judicial debate over the in forma pauperis statute 
highlighted the question whether and how appeals by poor persons should be 
pre-screened for possible merit. In Coppedge v. United States, the Supreme 
Court cautioned against imposing a screening procedure that would subject 
criminal appeals by poor persons to a standard different than that applied to 
appeals by other litigants.21 And in Nowakowski v. Maroney, the Court ruled 
that the district court’s provision of a certificate of probable cause qualified 
a habeas petitioner to take the appeal in forma pauperis.22 
The statute governing appeals in forma pauperis appeared to give 
discretion to the courts concerning whether to permit the appeal to proceed 
in forma pauperis, and it seemed to make available to the courts a pre-
screening mechanism for sifting out unfounded appeals by poor litigants. The 
relevant statute—28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)—empowered a court to authorize an 
appeal “without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person 
who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security 
                                                                                                                            
 18. As of 1968—and until 1996—the relevant portion of 28 U.S.C. § 2253 stated:  
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a 
habeas corpus proceeding where the detention complained of arises out of 
process issued by a State court, unless the justice or judge who rendered the 
order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause. 
28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 102, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–18 
(1996). No such requirement applied, at the time, to appeals by federal prisoners seeking relief 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. § 2255 (later amended in 1996 and 2008). 
 19. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892 (1983). 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 23–27. 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 37–38 (discussing Coppedge v. United States, 369 
U.S. 438 (1962)). 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 47–49 (discussing Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 
U.S. 542 (1967)). 
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therefor.”23 The affidavit was to “state the nature of the . . . appeal and [the] 
affiant’s belief that he [wa]s entitled to redress.”24 However, the statute 
provided that poor person status on appeal was unavailable “if the trial court 
certifie[d] in writing that [the appeal wa]s not taken in good faith.”25 As the 
Allen Committee observed, “[t]he concept of ‘good faith’ in this context is 
not self-defining; and the interpretation of the statute has proved to be a 
continuing source of difficulty.”26 As of the mid-1950s, the Committee 
reported, “the statutory language was widely understood as conferring on the 
lower federal courts authority to deny leave to appeal whenever the issues 
presented were thought not to afford a substantial possibility of 
reversal . . . .”27 
In a series of late-1950s criminal cases, the Supreme Court altered that 
understanding.28 In Ellis v. United States, the Court held that 
[t]he good-faith test must not be converted into a requirement of a 
preliminary showing of any particular degree of merit. Unless the 
issues raised are so frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in 
the case of a nonindigent litigant . . . , the request of an indigent for 
leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be allowed.29 
Soon thereafter, the Court built on Ellis in Coppedge, which addressed both 
the substantive and procedural aspects of § 1915’s framework.30 The 
Coppedge Court explicitly focused its analysis on the application of § 1915(a) 
in direct criminal appeals.31 The statutory and rule framework, the Court 
stressed, provided the criminal defendant with an appeal as of right,32 and the 
appeal concerned the weighty question of the defendant’s liberty.33 In this 
context, the Court ruled, “good faith” entailed an objective test that asked 
whether the appeal sought “review of any issue not frivolous.”34 The district 
court’s ruling on this question was “entitled to weight,” but was not 
dispositive.35 The would-be appellant who had received a not-in-good-faith 
                                                                                                                            
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1994) (last amended in 1996). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. ALLEN COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 97. 
 27. Id.  
 28. See id.  
 29. Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 674–75 (1958) (per curiam). 
 30. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). 
 31. See id. at 441, 444, 447. 
 32. See id. at 441. 
 33. See id. at 448–49. 
 34. Id. at 445. 
 35. Id. at 446. 
 
50:0247] FEDERAL RULES OF INMATE APPEALS 255 
 
ruling from the district court could seek in forma pauperis status directly from 
the court of appeals, and the court of appeals was to grant that status—
notwithstanding the district court’s contrary certification—if the defendant 
presented it with “any issue” that was “not clearly frivolous.”36 
The Coppedge Court explained its ruling in terms that strongly cautioned 
against applying summary procedures to appeals in forma pauperis that 
would not apply to paid appeals. Anti-discrimination principles, the Court 
indicated, created a “duty to assure to the greatest degree possible, within the 
statutory framework for appeals created by Congress, equal treatment for 
every litigant before the bar.”37 Equal treatment required that summary 
process be used for rich and poor alike—or for neither: 
If it were the practice of a Court of Appeals to screen the paid 
appeals on its docket for frivolity, without hearing oral argument, 
reviewing a record of the trial proceedings or considering full briefs, 
paupers could, of course, be bound by the same rules. But, if the 
practice of the Court of Appeals is to defer rulings on motions to 
dismiss paid appeals until the court has had the benefit of hearing 
argument and considering briefs and an adequate record, we hold it 
must no less accord the poor person the same procedural rights.38 
The Coppedge Court’s ruling left untouched the procedural framework set by 
the statute, but strove to interpret the statute’s substantive test in a way that 
would ensure equal treatment of poor and non-poor litigants. 
Two concurring Justices would have gone further to eliminate any 
distinctive treatment of in forma pauperis appeals. Justices Stewart and 
Brennan concurred in the majority opinion but wrote separately to suggest to 
the courts of appeals that in forma pauperis screening was not worthwhile in 
criminal appeals.39 The concurring Justices recognized that paying litigants 
were subject to a “built-in pecuniary brake upon frivolous appeals” and that 
this brake by definition did not affect indigent appellants.40 To stand in for 
that pecuniary brake, the statute allowed for early screening of indigent 
appeals—but did not, in their view, set a different merits standard for the 
dismissal of such an appeal: § 1915, they explained, “provides at most a 
device for advance screening of appeals which, if paid, would upon motion 
                                                                                                                            
 36. See id. The Court also ruled that where “the face of the . . . application” did not allow 
assessment of the application’s merit, the court of appeals must appoint counsel and ensure access 
to an adequate record. See id. 
 37. Id. at 446–47. 
 38. Id. at 448. 
 39. Id. at 458 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 40. Id. at 455. 
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be dismissed before argument as frivolous.”41 Arguing that such advance 
screening would raise due process concerns if it were too stringent, and would 
often result in duplication of effort, Justices Stewart and Brennan suggested 
that the courts of appeals might be well advised to dispense with such 
screening altogether, at least in criminal appeals: “[E]ach Court of Appeals 
might well consider whether its task could not be more expeditiously and 
responsibly performed by simply granting applications to appeal from 
criminal convictions in forma pauperis as a matter of course, and appointing 
counsel to brief and argue each case on the merits.”42 
By contrast, the two dissenting Justices in Coppedge castigated the 
majority for ignoring the statute’s mandate to treat such appeals more 
stringently. “[F]or all practical purposes,” they complained, the Court had 
“repeal[ed § 1915(a)] by placing the burden on the Government to sustain [a 
district court certification of lack of good faith] rather than on the indigent to 
overturn it.”43 Any inequality produced by in forma pauperis screening was 
intended by Congress,44 they argued, and such inequality raised no 
constitutional problem.45 
Although the Court’s ruling in Coppedge articulated the process and 
standard for direct criminal appeals in forma pauperis, the Court’s reasoning 
left open the possibility that a different test might apply in civil cases.46 And 
                                                                                                                            
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 458. The concurring Justices noted that  
[t]he Government would then be free in any case to file before argument a 
motion to dismiss the appeal as frivolous, as every appellee is always free to 
do. In the absence of such a motion an appeal which after argument appeared 
clearly without merit could be expeditiously disposed of by summary 
affirmance, in the secure knowledge that all the issues had been fully 
canvassed.  
Id.  
 43. Id. at 458–59 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 459 (“In the case of paid appeals Congress has not provided for a determination 
by the trial court of whether the issues warrant further review, and to treat nonpaid appeals like 
paid appeals is to ignore such a provision in the statute governing indigent appeals.”). 
 45. See id. at 460. As the dissenters saw it, “disparity in the burden of showing frivolity” 
did not “den[y] equal justice as between paid and nonpaid appeals.” Id. Although “Congress has 
set up a special procedure which subjects every nonpaid appeal to an examination to determine if 
further briefing and oral argument are necessary,” while “[s]uch an examination in the case of 
paid appeals is left to the initiative of the court or the Government,” the difference did not “give 
rise to a discrimination of constitutional proportions.” Id.  
 46. The Coppedge Court repeatedly alluded to the fact that the case involved a direct 
criminal appeal. See id. at 441, 444, 447. The Court at one point noted legislative history 
suggesting that the district judge’s ruling on good faith might warrant deference. A member of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, discussing the “good faith” provision in 1910, had noted the trial 
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Coppedge—involving as it did a direct criminal appeal by a federal 
defendant—did not address how § 1915’s “good faith” test fit with the habeas 
statute’s requirement of a certificate of probable cause. The Court answered 
the latter question in its 1967 decision in Nowakowski v. Maroney.47 
Nowakowski, a state prisoner, had obtained from the district court a 
certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his federal habeas 
petition, but the court of appeals had denied him leave to appeal in forma 
pauperis.48 In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court vacated and remanded, 
holding that “when a district judge grants [a certificate of probable cause], 
the court of appeals must grant an appeal in forma pauperis (assuming the 
requisite showing of poverty), and proceed to a disposition of the appeal in 
accord with its ordinary procedure.”49 
The 1960s, then, saw active debate, among federal judges, as to the 
stringency with which habeas and in forma pauperis appeals should be pre-
screened. The Warren Court’s decisions could well be read to express a 
strong concern for equal treatment of poor litigants, especially in the criminal 
context. And the Appellate Rules Committee, in drafting the new Appellate 
Rules, was well aware both of those decisions50 and of the adoption of the 
1964 Criminal Justice Act.51 As I argue below, the Appellate Rules 
Committee’s work product reflected similar concern for the appellate rights 
of indigent litigants. 
2. New Rules for Habeas and In Forma Pauperis Appeals 
Even apart from the backdrop of the Warren Court decisions, the adoption 
of Title VI of the original Appellate Rules would have been notable. At the 
                                                                                                                            
judge’s ability “to judge whether it is a case proceeding captiously, or viciously, or with prejudice, 
or from any other improper motive, or whether the litigant is proceeding in good faith.” Id. at 445 
n.8. But, the Court asserted, this Senator “was discussing primarily civil suits.” Id. 
 47. 386 U.S. 542, 542–43 (1967) (per curiam). 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. at 543. 
 50. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE MAY 1963 
MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 23 (1963) [hereinafter MAY 1963 
MINUTES], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP05-1963-min.pdf (noting a 
Committee member’s suggestion concerning a way that the draft rule on in forma pauperis appeals 
could “meet the points raised in Coppedge and other cases”). 
 51. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE NOVEMBER 1964 
MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 14 (1964) [hereinafter NOVEMBER 
1964 MINUTES], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP11-1964-min.pdf 
(noting the Committee Chair’s suggestion “that the Committee should re-examine [proposed Rule 
24] in the light of the new Criminal Justice Act and plans formulated under it”). 
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time, the sets of national rules did not do much to address procedure in habeas 
or § 2255 cases,52 and neither the Civil nor the Criminal Rules contained 
much in the way of discussion of requests to proceed in forma pauperis.53 
Beyond the adoption of a special title devoted to the topic of habeas and in 
forma pauperis appeals, the Appellate Rules also made a number of 
innovations in procedures for habeas cases and cases involving indigent 
litigants. 
In the late 1960s, procedural uncertainty combined with docket trends to 
make clear the need for the adoption of rules governing the procedures for 
postconviction review. Although habeas and § 2255 proceedings, then as 
now, were viewed as civil in nature,54 Civil Rule 81 significantly, though 
somewhat indeterminately, limited the application of the Civil Rules in 
postconviction review proceedings.55 In 1969, the Supreme Court—while 
authorizing the judicial development of procedures to govern discovery 
practice in habeas cases—expressed its “view that the rule-making machinery 
should be invoked to formulate rules of practice with respect to federal habeas 
                                                                                                                            
 52. See infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
 53. See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
 54. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. R. § 2254 CASES 11(b) (“Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a) governs the time to appeal an order entered under these rules.”); U.S. DIST. CT. R. § 2255 
CASES 11(b) (“Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) governs the time to appeal an order 
entered under these rules.”); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 208–09 (2007) (applying Appellate 
Rule 4(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107 to an appeal by a habeas petitioner); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 
423–24 (1963) (noting “the traditional characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as an 
original . . . civil remedy for the enforcement of the right to personal liberty, rather than as a stage 
of the state criminal proceedings or as an appeal therefrom” (citation omitted)), limited on other 
grounds by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87–88 (1977), and overruled on other grounds by 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209 
n.4 (1952) (“Appeals from orders denying motions under Section 2255 are governed by the civil 
rules applicable to appeals from final judgments in habeas corpus actions.”); see also 
Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1155 & n.3 (1970) 
[hereinafter Habeas Developments]. 
 55. Prior to its amendment in 1968, Rule 81(a)(2) provided:  
In the following proceedings appeals are governed by these rules, but they are 
not applicable otherwise than on appeal except to the extent that the practice 
in such proceedings is not set forth in the statutes of the United States and has 
heretofore conformed to the practice in actions at law or suits in equity: . . . 
habeas corpus . . . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(2) (1966) (Rule 81 has been amended multiple times since then most recently 
in 2009.). The Rule further provided that the statutory requirements “relating to certification of 
probable cause in certain appeals in habeas corpus cases remain in force.” Id. See generally 
Habeas Developments, supra note 54, at 1155–58 (discussing the interpretation of Civil Rule 
81(a)(2)). 
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corpus and § 2255 proceedings, on a comprehensive basis.”56 The rulemakers 
took up this assignment, drafting sets of rules governing § 2254 and § 2255 
proceedings. The Supreme Court promulgated those rules in 1976, and 
Congress—after passing legislation to temporarily suspend them from taking 
effect—enacted them into law (with some modifications) in 1977.57 
Thus, when the Appellate Rules were being drafted, there were no sets of 
national rules that systematically treated habeas and § 2255 proceedings. The 
Civil Rules that governed appeal procedure did expressly apply to habeas and 
§ 2255 proceedings,58 but those rules included no distinctive portions tailored 
for such proceedings, other than a proviso ensuring that the rules did not 
supersede the statutory requirement for a certificate of probable cause.59 
The new Appellate Rules treated habeas appeals (though not § 2255 
appeals) in much greater detail. Rule 22(a) specified where to file an original 
habeas application (typically in the district court) and how to seek court of 
appeals review (preferably by appeal). Rule 22(b) addressed in some detail 
the procedure for seeking the statutorily-required certificate of probable 
cause, and stated that only the petitioner, and not the government, needed 
such a certificate in order to appeal.60 Rule 23—which was modeled very 
closely on a U.S. Supreme Court Rule61—addressed the custody of prisoners 
                                                                                                                            
 56. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 n.7 (1969). In Harris, the majority held “that Rule 
33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to habeas corpus proceedings and that 
28 U.S.C. § 2246 does not authorize interrogatories except in limited circumstances,” but it also 
held “that, in appropriate circumstances, a district court, confronted by a petition for habeas 
corpus which establishes a prima facie case for relief, may use or authorize the use of suitable 
discovery procedures, including interrogatories.” Id. at 290. 
 57. See Charles Alan Wright, Procedure for Habeas Corpus, 77 F.R.D. 227, 227–28 (1978). 
 58. Prior to the 1968 amendments, Civil Rule 81(a)(2) provided in part: “In the following 
proceedings appeals are governed by these rules, but they are not applicable otherwise than on 
appeal except to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in the statutes of 
the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in actions at law or suits in 
equity: . . . habeas corpus . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(2) (1966) (amended 2009). 
 59. See supra note 55 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(2) (1966) (later amended in 2009)). 
 60. This provision was added at the suggestion of Professor Charles Alan Wright (who was 
then a member of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure). See ADVISORY 
COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE JULY MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
APPELLATE RULES 2 (1966), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP07-1966-
min.pdf. The 1967 Committee Note to Rule 22(b) acknowledged that the statutory text seemed to 
require the certificate no matter which side sought to appeal, but the Note relied on legislative 
history and caselaw in four circuits to support the Rule’s specification that the government side 
need not obtain a certificate in order to appeal. FED. R. APP. P. 22(b) advisory committee’s note 
to 1967 amendment. 
 61. The 1967 Committee Note to Rule 23 stated simply: “The rule is the same as Supreme 
Court Rule 49, as amended on June 12, 1967, effective October 2, 1967.” FED. R. APP. P. 23 
advisory committee’s note to 1967 amendment; see also MAY 1963 
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during appellate review of habeas proceedings. It imposed controls over the 
transfer of a prisoner during the pendency of such a proceeding,62 and it set 
default rules governing release or custody of a prisoner pending review of 
lower-court orders granting63 or denying64 release. 
As for petitions to proceed in forma pauperis, the late-1960s national rules 
likewise had relatively little to say. As amended in 1966, Civil Rule 73(g) 
provided that an appeal would be docketed upon the court of appeals’ clerk’s 
receipt “of the record on appeal and, unless the appellant is authorized to 
proceed without prepayment of fees, of the docket fee fixed by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States.”65 Prior to the 1966 amendments, Civil Rule 
75(m) provided that “[u]pon leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the district 
court may by order specify some different and more economical manner by 
which the record on appeal may be prepared and settled, to the end that the 
appellant may be enabled to present his case to the appellate court.”66 As for 
the Criminal Rules, Criminal Rule 17 required court issuance of subpoenas 
to witnesses whose testimony was necessary and whose fees the defendant 
could not pay.67 Criminal Rule 32(a)(2) required the trial court, “[a]fter 
                                                                                                                            
MINUTES, supra note 50, at 25 (“Professor Ward stated that this was the Supreme Court Rule on 
habeas corpus which was promulgated by the Supreme Court and is binding on the courts of 
appeals and the district courts by its own force. The Committee agreed that this rule should be 
included in the Appellate Rules . . . .”). 
 62. See FED. R. APP. P. 23(a) (1967). Rule 23 has since been amended twice, most recently 
in 1998. 
 63. See id. 23(c). 
 64. See id. 23(b). 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 73(g) (1966) (abrogated 1967). 
 66. Id. 75(m) (1948) (abrogated 1966). This provision was deleted in 1966 because the 1966 
amendments to Civil Rule 75 made “the former designation-copy method of preparing the record 
on appeal . . . obsolete.” Id. advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 67. This provision’s evolution showed the influence of the Allen Committee. As of the early 
1960s, Rule 17(b) applied to “indigent” defendants and required the supporting affidavit to be 
shared with the government. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b) (1946) (last amended in 2002). 
Amendments in 1966 changed the requirement from indigence to a showing “that the defendant 
is financially unable to pay the fees of the witness,” and provided that the application would be 
ex parte. See id. (1966). The 1966 Committee Note explained: 
Criticism has been directed at the requirement that an indigent defendant 
disclose in advance the theory of his defense in order to obtain the issuance of 
a subpoena at government expense while the government and defendants able 
to pay may have subpoenas issued in blank without any disclosure. See Report 
of the Attorney General’s Committee on Poverty and the Administration of 
Criminal Justice (1963) p. 27. The Attorney General’s Committee also urged 
that the standard of financial inability to pay be substituted for that of 
indigency. Id. at 40–41. 
Id. advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
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imposing sentence in a case which has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, 
[to] advise the defendant of his right to appeal and of the right of a person 
who is unable to pay the cost of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in 
forma pauperis.”68 Interestingly, the requirement that the court mention the 
right to seek leave to appeal in forma pauperis was added in 1966,69 and there 
is reason to think that it was suggested to the Criminal Rules Committee by 
the Appellate Rules Committee.70 
                                                                                                                            
 68. Id. 32(a)(2) (1966). Criminal Rule 32 has been amended multiple times since then, most 
recently in 2011. 
 69. The 1966 Committee Note explained: 
The court is required to advise the defendant of his right to appeal in all cases 
which have gone to trial after plea of not guilty because situations arise in 
which a defendant represented by counsel at the trial is not adequately advised 
by such counsel of his right to appeal. . . . Because indigent defendants are 
most likely to be without effective assistance of counsel at this point in the 
proceedings, it is also provided that defendants be notified of the right of a 
person without funds to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 
Id. advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. Prior to 1966, the provision requiring trial-
court advice to the convicted defendant was located in Criminal Rule 37(a)(2), which stated in 
part that “[w]hen a court after trial imposes sentence upon a defendant not represented by counsel, 
the defendant shall be advised of his right to appeal . . . .” Id. 37(a)(2) (1948) (repealed 1968). It 
appears likely that the Appellate Rules Committee provided input to the Criminal Rules 
Committee in connection with the formulation of the 1966 amendment. See MAY 1963 MINUTES, 
supra note 50, at 23 (noting the Appellate Rules Committee’s approval of a provision concerning 
in forma pauperis criminal appeals that “will be included in the Criminal Rules for the District 
Courts, and may also be included in the Appellate Rules”). 
 70. The minutes of an August 1963 Appellate Rules Committee meeting state in part: 
The last two sentences of [what then was proposed Appellate Rule] 4(d) were 
made a separate paragraph of the subdivision, and the paragraph will read as 
follows: 
“When a court after trial imposes sentence upon a 
defendant, the judge shall advise the defendant of his right 
to appeal and of the procedure for seeking leave to appeal 
in forma pauperis if he is without funds, and if he so 
requests, the clerk of the court shall prepare and file 
forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant. A 
judgment or order is entered within the meaning of this 
subdivision when it is noted in the criminal docket.” 
The Committee agreed to include these two sentences in the Appellate Rules, 
and to recommend that the Criminal Rules Committee include the identical 
provisions in their rules on this subject. 
 
ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE AUGUST 1963 MEETING OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 4 (1963) [hereinafter AUGUST 1963 MINUTES].  
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Appellate Rule 24 included significant detail on applications to proceed in 
forma pauperis in the courts of appeals. In articulating the process for seeking 
leave to appeal in forma pauperis from a district court,71 new Rule 24(a) 
responded to a critique that the Allen Committee had leveled at prior practice. 
If the district court denied leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the Allen 
Committee had reported, the statute directed the district court “to certify in 
writing that the appeal is not taken in good faith,” but did not require the 
district court to explain that certification.72 Noting that “at least one circuit 
requires a written statement of reasons whenever the district judge gives a 
‘bad faith’ certification, and the same practice is followed by some district 
judges throughout the country,” the Allen Committee urged “that so long as 
the screening procedures are retained, the memorandum requirement should 
be made general.”73 Doing so, the Allen Committee had argued, would 
promote “careful consideration of these decisions in the district courts and 
would provide a sounder basis for subsequent decisions in the courts of 
appeals.”74 
Thus, it seems possible that new Rule 24(a)’s directive that “[i]f the 
motion is denied, the district court shall state in writing the reasons for the 
denial,” might have owed its origin to the Allen Committee’s 
recommendations. The Committee Note to Rule 24(a), however, did not cite 
the Allen Committee Report; instead, it merely noted that the new written-
reason requirement had “no counterpart in present circuit rules, but it has been 
imposed by decision in at least two circuits.”75 And, indeed, the Appellate 
Rules Committee’s discussion of this topic, as reflected in the minutes of a 
meeting that occurred a few months after the issuance of the Allen Committee 
Report, did not mention the Allen Committee; Appellate Rules Committee 
members’ stated rationale for the requirement was that requiring the district 
                                                                                                                            
 71. Initially, the Appellate Rules Committee considered promulgating a separate rule 
specifically for criminal in forma pauperis appeals. Late in the process, the Committee decided 
instead to treat both civil and criminal appeals in a single rule. See ADVISORY COMM. ON 
APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE MAY MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE 
RULES 19 (1965) [hereinafter MAY 1965 MINUTES] (“A suggestion was made by the Reporter that 
Rule 24 [concerning ‘Appeals in Forma Pauperis in Criminal Cases’] be stricken and that Rule 23 
cover the entire subject of pauperis appeals. The Committee approved the suggestion as the most 
practical solution.”). 
 72. ALLEN COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 100. 
 73. Id.; see also id. at 120 n.48 (citing United States ex rel. Breedlove v. Dowd, 269 F.2d 
693 (7th Cir. 1959)). 
 74. Id. at 100. 
 75. FED. R. APP. P. 24(a) advisory committee’s note to 1967 adoption (citing Ragan v. Cox, 
305 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1962), and Breedlove, 269 F.2d at 693). One of these cases—Breedlove—
had also been cited by the Allen Committee Report. See supra note 73. 
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court to provide its reasons would help the court of appeals when it 
considered whether to grant in forma pauperis status.76 
The second paragraph of Rule 24(a) adopted a presumption that a would-
be appellant who had been granted in forma pauperis status in the district 
court could proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, unless the district court 
ruled otherwise (and stated its reasons in writing).77 This provision appears 
to have arisen from suggestions by Professor Charles Alan Wright and Judge 
Richard T. Rives. Concerning a comment submitted by Professor Wright, the 
Committee’s November 1964 minutes stated: 
It was suggested that a separate motion for leave to appeal in forma 
pauperis and a new supporting affidavit is unnecessary and that the 
procedure for the further screening of appeals is cumbersome. On 
motion of Judge Rives, the Committee voted to follow the practice 
in the Sixth Circuit which authorizes a party to proceed on appeal 
in forma pauperis without additional leave, if he has been initially 
granted such leave “in a cause in the district court[.]”78 
Rule 24(b) addressed applications to proceed in forma pauperis when 
petitioning in the court of appeals for review of agency decisions. Rule 24(c) 
authorized in forma pauperis appellants to file typewritten papers and to seek 
permission to use the original record (so that they would not have to 
reproduce any portions of it).79 And Form 4 in the Appendix of Forms 
provided a brief (roughly five-question) affidavit that illustrated how an 
applicant seeking in forma pauperis status should attest to “his inability to 
                                                                                                                            
 76. See MAY 1963 MINUTES, supra note 50, at 22–23 (“Should the trial court be required to 
state the reasons for denying the application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis? Several of the 
judges expressed approval of such a requirement as being helpful to the court of appeals in acting 
on the application.”). 
 77. The paragraph provided: 
[A] party who has been permitted to proceed in an action in the district court 
in forma pauperis, or who has been permitted to proceed there as one who is 
financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in a criminal case, may 
proceed on appeal in forma pauperis without further authorization unless, 
before or after the notice of appeal is filed, the district court shall certify that 
the appeal is not taken in good faith or shall find that the party is otherwise not 
entitled so to proceed, in which event the district court shall state in writing 
the reasons for such certification or finding. 
FED. R. APP. P. 24(a) (1968) (last amended in 2002). 
 78. NOVEMBER 1964 MINUTES, supra note 51, at 14. For further details concerning the 
drafting of the resulting provision, see MAY 1965 MINUTES, supra note 71, at 18–19. 
 79. FED. R. APP. P. 32(a) (1968) (last amended 2016) (permitting in forma pauperis 
litigants—but presumptively not others—to submit “[c]arbon copies of briefs and appendices”).  
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pay fees and costs or to give security therefor, his belief that he is entitled to 
redress, and a statement of the issues which he intends to present on appeal.”80 
3. The Treatment of “Appeals as of Right” 
The prevailing mood of concern that prisoners and indigent litigants be 
accorded access to courts might help to explain a puzzle concerning the 
Appellate Rules’ classification of habeas and in forma pauperis appeals. The 
original Appellate Rules, like the current rules, treated “appeals as of right” 
in Rules 3 (“Appeal as of Right—How Taken”) and 4 (“Appeal as of Right—
When Taken”). The rulemakers plainly intended those provisions to 
encompass habeas appeals and appeals in forma pauperis, even though—
especially in the case of habeas appeals—one might have argued that calling 
the appeal “as of right” was not completely accurate. In drafting Appellate 
Rules 3 and 4, the rulemakers also stressed the importance of applying those 
rules flexibly in the cases of indigents and inmates. 
The drafters of the Appellate Rules intended that habeas appeals, like 
§ 2255 appeals, were to be treated under Rule 4 as appeals of right. Rule 3(d), 
in fact, referred specifically to the treatment of the notice of appeal “in 
criminal cases, habeas corpus proceedings, or proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.”81 Though Rule 5 now generally governs permissive appeals,82 the 
original Rule 5 was much narrower, and made clear that it was designed 
specifically for interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).83 
                                                                                                                            
 80. Id. 24(a) (1968) (last amended in 2002). 
 81. Id. 3(d) (1968) (last amended in 1998), in 43 F.R.D. 61, 69 (1968). 
 82. Rule 5’s current breadth stems from amendments in 1998. The 1998 Committee Note 
refers to the 1992 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), which authorized the promulgation of rules 
providing for interlocutory appeals. The Committee Note explains that Rule 5’s amendment was 
“prompted by the possibility of new rules authorizing additional interlocutory appeals. Rather 
than add a separate rule governing each such appeal, the Committee believes it is preferable to 
amend Rule 5 so that it will govern all such appeals.” Id. 5 advisory committee’s note to 1998 
amendment. And the Committee Note listed the then-extant avenues of appeal to which the 
Committee expected the amended Rule to apply:  
This new Rule 5 is intended to govern all discretionary appeals from district-
court orders, judgments, or decrees. At this time that includes interlocutory 
appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), (c)(1), and (d)(1) & (2). If additional 
interlocutory appeals are authorized under § 1292(e), the new Rule is intended 
to govern them if the appeals are discretionary. 
Id. 
 83. The text of original Rule 5 specified its application to “[a]n appeal from an interlocutory 
order containing the statement prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).” Id. 5(a) (1968) (last amended 
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Why might the drafters of the original rules have classed habeas appeals 
with appeals as of right? One possible answer is that they simply carried 
forward the then-extant practice, which used a notice of appeal, not a petition 
for permission to appeal, as the vehicle for commencing an appeal from a 
judgment in a habeas case.84 Or perhaps the members of the Appellate Rules 
Committee did not see the certificate-of-probable-cause requirement as a 
significant barrier to most habeas appeals. In remarks delivered a few weeks 
before the Supreme Court’s promulgation of the Appellate Rules,85 then-
Judge Harry Blackmun observed that there was “[n]o uniformly accepted 
definition of probable cause”; he suggested that the closest approximation 
might be that the statute “demands something of possible substance before 
the applicant is legally entitled to his certificate.”86 Though Judge 
Blackmun’s formulation seems to have been less stringent than those applied 
by some of his colleagues around the country, it would be more than a decade 
and a half before the Supreme Court endorsed “the weight of opinion in the 
Courts of Appeals that a certificate of probable cause requires petitioner to 
make a ‘substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right.’”87 
The Committee Note to the original Rule 3 stressed the “mandatory and 
jurisdictional” nature of the deadline for taking an appeal,88 but the Note also 
stressed that filings by pro se inmates should be treated with appropriate 
flexibility. To illustrate the proposition that “decisions under the present rules 
which dispense with literal compliance in cases in which it cannot fairly be 
                                                                                                                            
in 1998). And the Rule’s original title was “Appeals by Permission Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).” 
Id. Rule 5 has been amended multiple times since then, most recently in 2016. 
 84. For a reference to the filing of notices of appeal in habeas cases, see, for example, 
AUGUST 1963 MINUTES, supra note 70, at 2 (“Judge Rives suggested that [draft Appellate Rule] 
3(a) include language to cover the situation where the notice of appeal is presented to a district 
judge or to a single judge of the court of appeals, mainly in criminal and habeas corpus appeals.”). 
 85. The remarks were delivered at the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference in September 
1967. See Harry A. Blackmun, Judge, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Allowance of in Forma 
Pauperis Appeals in § 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, Remarks at the Eighth Circuit Judicial 
Conference (Sept. 18, 1967), in 43 F.R.D. 343, 343 n.a1 (1968). The Supreme Court promulgated 
the Appellate Rules on December 4, 1967. See 43 F.R.D. 61, 67 (U.S. 1968). 
 86. Blackmun, supra note 85, at 360. 
 87. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983). 
 88. More recently, the Supreme Court has held that statutory appeal deadlines are 
jurisdictional. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007). In the wake of Bowles, it is clear 
that the deadlines for taking a civil appeal—which are set by 28 U.S.C. § 2107 as well as by 
Appellate Rule 4(a)—are jurisdictional. See generally 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3950.1 (4th ed. 2008), Westlaw (database updated April 
2017). By contrast, a federal criminal defendant’s direct-appeal deadline is set by Appellate Rule 
4(b) but not by statute, and the courts of appeals accordingly have held (in light of Bowles’s 
reasoning) that that deadline is mandatory but not jurisdictional. See generally id. § 3950.8 & 
n.63. 
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exacted should control interpretation of these rules,” the Committee Note first 
cited Fallen v. United States89 for its holding that a “notice of appeal by a 
prisoner, in the form of a letter delivered, well within the time fixed for 
appeal, to prison authorities for mailing to the clerk of the district court [was] 
timely filed notwithstanding that it was received by the clerk after expiration 
of the time for appeal,” on the ground that “the appellant ‘did all he could’ to 
effect timely filing.”90 After citing three other decisions—two of which 
involved notices of appeal misdirected by pro se inmates91—the Note 
observed that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Coppedge v. United States had 
cited “[e]arlier cases evidencing ‘a liberal view of papers filed by indigent 
and incarcerated defendants.’”92 
The inclusion of these citations in the Committee Note reflected a 
deliberate choice by the Committee. Moreover, the Committee’s discussion 
of the Note indicated an expectation that the principles reflected in the Note 
would stand in for more explicit Rule text directing liberal treatment of 
attempts to file a notice of appeal. At the May 1965 meeting, during 
discussion of proposed Appellate Rule 3, Professor Ward (the Committee’s 
Reporter) “stated the Committee had tried to include in the proposed rule 
provisions which would persuade the courts of appeals to treat the ‘good 
faith’ attempt to appeal as an appeal itself,” and he reminded the Committee 
that “at its last meeting [it] asked the Reporter to draw up a Note citing the 
recent liberal decisions in lieu of the present Note.”93 Now that the Note 
discussed those decisions, the Reporter suggested, the Committee could 
                                                                                                                            
 89. 378 U.S. 139 (1964). 
 90. FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory committee’s note to original Appellate Rule 3 (1968) (quoting 
Fallen, 378 U.S. at 144), in 43 F.R.D. 61, 126 (1968). 
 91. The Committee Note cited Richey v. Wilkins, 335 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1964) for the 
proposition that a “notice filed in the court of appeals by a prisoner without assistance of counsel” 
sufficed, and Riffle v. United States, 299 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962) for the proposition that a “letter 
of [a] prisoner to [a] judge of [the] court of appeals” sufficed. FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory 
committee’s note to original Appellate Rule 3 (1968), in 43 F.R.D. 61, 126 (1968). 
 92. FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory committee’s note to original Appellate Rule 3 (1968) (quoting 
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 442 n.5 (1962)), in 43 F.R.D. 61, 126 (1968). 
 93. MAY 1965 MINUTES, supra note 71, at 2.  
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delete some of the draft Rule language in reliance on the Note discussion; and 
the Committee acceded to this proposal.94 
The drafters of the original Appellate Rules, then, were well aware of 
Warren Court precedent that stressed the value of equal access to appellate 
justice for indigent and incarcerated litigants; and I have noted here some 
evidence that such concern underpinned both the inmate- and indigent-
specific provisions and more general provisions in the rules. But the rules did 
not yet spell out any special provisions addressing methods of filing by 
inmate litigants; that question would be addressed some two decades later, 
initially in a decision by the Rehnquist Court, and then in new provisions 
developed responsively by the rulemakers. 
In the meantime, both the number of incarcerated people and the number 
of inmate lawsuits swelled. As Fred Cheesman and his coauthors have 
observed,  
[T]he number of habeas corpus petitions filed nationally grew at a 
very slow rate from 1941 until 1962, as did the national state-
prisoner population. Habeas corpus petitions then rose sharply (in 
response to U.S. Supreme Court decisions broadening the authority 
of federal courts to review state court convictions) until 1970.95 
                                                                                                                            
 94. The May 1965 Minutes state: 
The Reporter presented a revised draft of a general Note, but stated that so 
much of the rule itself, particularly lines 11–20 of subdivision (a) in the 
Preliminary Draft, suggests generous handling. Therefore, the Reporter 
suggested that lines 11–20 be eliminated but that the rest of the rule remain as 
stated, referring the reader to the general Note which makes the same point 
and cites specific cases. The Committee, upon motion of Judge Barnes, 
approved deletion of lines 11–20, and approval of the general Note. 
Id. It appears—based on a comparison of the version of Appellate Rule 3(a) that was published 
for comment in March of 1964 and the version of Appellate Rule 3(a) as adopted effective 1968—
that the lines that were deleted read:  
If a defendant in a criminal case or an applicant in a habeas corpus proceeding 
or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 shall present the notice of appeal to 
the court of appeals or to a judge of the court of appeals or to a judge of the 
district court, the notice shall be transmitted to the clerk of the district court 
and shall be considered to have been filed in that court on the date on which it 
was thus presented. 
Compare Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 34 F.R.D. 263, 272 (1964), 
with FED. R. APP. P. 3(a) (1968), in 43 F.R.D. 61, 68 (1968) (last amended in 1998). 
 95. Fred Cheesman, II et al., A Tale of Two Laws: The U.S. Congress Confronts Habeas 
Corpus Petitions and Section 1983 Lawsuits, 22 LAW & POL’Y 89, 92 (2000). 
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After a hiatus during the 1970s,96 “the number of habeas corpus petitions filed 
by state prisoners . . . increased markedly” after 1981 “as state prison 
populations experienced nearly exponential growth.”97 A similar story 
unfolded outside of habeas: “Between 1972 and 1996, the number of state 
prisoner § 1983 lawsuits filed in U.S. district courts increased by 1,153 
percent . . . , while state prison population increased by 517 percent . . . .”98 
B. The Prison Mailbox Rule 
The text of the original Appellate Rules, then, addressed inmate filings in 
Title VI—concerning habeas and in forma pauperis appeals—but did not 
articulate any special rules concerning the logistics of inmate filings. This is 
not because the Committee was unaware that inmate filings might call for 
special flexibility, but rather because the Committee relegated the discussion 
of that issue to the Committee Notes. As practice developed, however—and 
as a new textualism began to take hold among judges—the failure to address 
this issue in Rule text took on new salience. 
In this section, I first discuss the principle that was implicit in the original 
Rule 3, and to which the Committee adverted in that Rule’s Committee Note. 
That principle—which I will term the implicit prison mailbox rule—grew out 
of a case, Fallen v. United States, that was quite closely intertwined with the 
work of the Appellate Rules Committee. As I discuss in Part I.B.1, the 
Supreme Court in Fallen held that an inmate’s delivery of a notice of appeal 
to prison authorities sufficed as filing for purposes of a direct criminal appeal; 
and the Appellate Rules Committee intended to build this holding into the 
understanding of the new Appellate Rule 3. In Part I.B.2, I turn to the debate 
over whether the rule in Fallen should be extended beyond the context of 
direct criminal appeals. In the 1988 decision in Houston v. Lack, a closely-
divided Court did extend the Fallen rule—over a vigorous dissent that argued 
the change was a matter for rulemaking rather than judicial decision. 
Houston, in turn, prompted rulemaking action both by the Supreme Court 
itself (which adopted a new Supreme Court Rule)99 and by the Appellate 
Rules Committee—which adopted new Appellate Rule 4(c) and amended 
Appellate Rule 25(a).100 Those new rules gave textual sanction to the prison 
                                                                                                                            
 96. Id. (stating that “the number of habeas corpus petitions leveled off or declined very 
slightly [during the 1970s] as state courts focused on improving their capacity to apply appropriate 
constitutional standards to criminal cases”). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 94. 
 99. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 100. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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mailbox rule. But both Houston itself and the new rules that followed in its 
wake left some questions unaddressed. In Part I.B.3, I note that—in 
particular—the rules and Supreme Court caselaw did not specifically address 
the potential problem of delay by prison authorities in delivering mail to an 
inmate. That problem, Part I.B.3 notes, can be mitigated in some circuits by 
circuit caselaw applying the prison mailbox rule to incoming as well as 
outgoing mail; in other circuits, the best tools for addressing the problem lie 
in rule provisions that apply generally to all filers, inmate and non-inmate 
alike. 
1. Fallen v. United States and the Implicit Prison Mailbox Rule 
I mentioned in a prior section that the Appellate Rules Committee had 
cited the Fallen case in the Committee Note to Rule 3, to illustrate the 
intended liberality with which that Rule should be construed.101 In fact, the 
connection between Fallen and the Appellate Rules is even closer than this 
citation indicates. Judge Richard T. Rives, a Fifth Circuit judge noted for his 
commitment to civil rights, dissented from the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of 
Fallen’s appeal—a dissent the thrust of which the Supreme Court went on to 
adopt. During the same time period, Judge Rives was serving as a member of 
the Appellate Rules Committee, and he participated actively in the 
formulation of the rules that I discussed, in the prior section, concerning 
appeals by inmate litigants. 
By the time, in 1962, that he considered Fallen’s appeal, circumstances 
and principle had thrust Judge Rives into the center of the federal judiciary’s 
implementation of civil rights in the South. In 1956, Judge Rives wrote for 
the panel majority on the three-judge district court that held segregated bus 
service in Montgomery, Alabama to be unconstitutional.102 Over the years 
that followed, Judge Rives and three of his Fifth Circuit colleagues became 
legendary for their decisions on desegregation.103 For this work, Judge Rives 
and his wife faced obloquy and abuse—including threatening telephone calls; 
                                                                                                                            
 101. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 102. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala.), aff’d, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) 
(mem.), and aff’d sub nom. Owen v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.). 
 103. For a chronicle of their work, see generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE 
DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE 
SUPREME COURT’S BROWN DECISION INTO A REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981). See Obituary, 
Richard T. Rives, Judge on Court that Helped Integrate the South, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 1982), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/10/30/obituaries/richard-t-rives-judge-on-court-that-helped-
integrate-the-south.html (recalling Judge Rives as one “whose landmark legal decisions helped 
desegregate the South”). 
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ostracism in their church; and the defacing of their son’s gravestone.104 
Undeterred, Judge Rives went on to author further pathmarking civil rights 
decisions—such as those in 1959 and 1962 implementing the prohibition on 
race discrimination in jury selection.105 Thus, it seems fair to infer that, when 
Chief Justice Earl Warren (sometime in 1960 or 1961) appointed Judge Rives 
as a member of the original Appellate Rules Committee,106 the Chief Justice 
knew that he was selecting a strong voice for civil rights and the rights of 
criminal defendants. Judge Rives’ 1962 dissent in Fallen was in keeping with 
his prior work in this regard. 
Floyd Charles Fallen, a wheelchair-bound paraplegic,107 was confined 
under guard in a Florida hospital until the day after his sentencing, when he 
was transferred to a federal penitentiary in Georgia.108 His court-appointed 
trial lawyer had declined to represent him in connection with his appeal.109 
Fallen later explained that, due to the transfer and his medical condition, he 
was unable to write his pro se notice of appeal until eight days after he was 
sentenced.110 The district court received Fallen’s notice of appeal fourteen 
days after the entry of judgment—four days later than the deadline then set 
by Criminal Rule 37.111 Stressing the jurisdictional nature of the deadline, the 
Fifth Circuit panel majority dismissed Fallen’s appeal.112 Judge Rives, in 
dissent, decried the dismissal as “a gross injustice, and one not consonant 
with the law.”113 Judge Rives would have found the appeal timely on two 
grounds. One was a concern—grounded in the Sixth Amendment—that the 
                                                                                                                            
 104. See BASS, supra note 103, at 79–80. 
 105. See United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 55 (5th Cir. 1962); United States 
ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1959); see also Obituary, supra note 103 
(quoting Professor Harvey Couch as stating that these “landmark decisions” were “[t]he thing that 
[Judge Rives] will be remembered for”). 
 106. The initial meeting of the Appellate Rules Committee, in 1960, included only a handful 
of Committee members, not including Judge Rives. See ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, 
MINUTES OF THE JULY 1960 MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 1 
(1960), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP07-1960-min.pdf. By the second 
meeting, in November 1961, the roster of Committee members included Judge Rives. See 
ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE NOVEMBER 1961 MEETING OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 1 (1961), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP11-1961-min.pdf. 
 107. See Fallen v. United States, 306 F.2d 697, 700 n.2, 703 (5th Cir. 1962), rev’d, 378 U.S. 
139 (1964). 
 108. See id. at 699 n.1. 
 109. See id. at 698. 
 110. See id. at 700. 
 111. See id. at 701. 
 112. See id. at 702–03. 
 113. See id. at 703 (Rives, J., dissenting). 
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trial court had failed to advise Fallen of the deadline for filing his notice of 
appeal and that Fallen’s trial counsel had failed to assist him in filing his 
notice of appeal.114 The other was the view that, under the circumstances, 
Fallen had taken reasonable steps to file his pro se notice of appeal within the 
deadline. The evidence, in Judge Rives’ view, justified a finding that 
on January 23, eight days after sentence, Fallen signed the two 
letters and turned them over to the prison authorities for mailing. At 
that time, clearly, he attempted to appeal. If the Government had 
not, on the day after he was sentenced, moved him from the place 
of trial [in Florida] to the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, his 
attempted appeal would have been filed within 10 days after entry 
of the judgment of conviction. Further, if the prison authorities had 
promptly mailed Fallen’s letters, then, in due course of mail they 
would have reached the Clerk’s Office before the expiration of the 
10th day.115 
In reversing, the Supreme Court adopted the thrust of Judge Rives’ view 
concerning the efficacy of Fallen’s filing. Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Chief Justice Warren began by emphasizing “that the Rules are not, and were 
not intended to be, a rigid code to have an inflexible meaning irrespective of 
the circumstances.”116 After reviewing in detail the challenges that Fallen 
faced in filing his notice of appeal, the Court concluded: “Since petitioner did 
all he could under the circumstances, we decline to read the Rules so rigidly 
as to bar a determination of his appeal on the merits.”117 
Four concurring Justices would have gone beyond the specific 
circumstance to articulate a general rule for pro se federal criminal appeals. 
They would have held “that for purposes of [Criminal] Rule 37(a)(2), a 
defendant incarcerated in a federal prison and acting without the aid of 
counsel files his notice of appeal in time, if, within the 10-day period provided 
by the Rule, he delivers such notice to the prison authorities for forwarding 
to the clerk of the District Court.”118 To the concurring Justices, “in such a 
case the jailer is in effect the clerk of the District Court within the meaning 
of Rule 37.”119 
It seems likely that the Appellate Rules Committee closely followed the 
progress of the Fallen case. Less than a year after the Court adopted Judge 
                                                                                                                            
 114. See id. at 705–06. 
 115. See id. at 704. 
 116. Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 142 (1964). 
 117. Id. at 144. 
 118. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 119. Id. 
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Rives’ approach in Fallen, the Committee gave the case prominent treatment 
in the Committee Note to Appellate Rule 3. New Appellate Rules 3 and 4, 
the Committee Note explained, carried forward (with some changes) the 
appeal provisions in the Civil and Criminal Rules, “and decisions under the 
present rules which dispense with literal compliance in cases in which it 
cannot fairly be exacted should control interpretation of these rules.”120 First 
among the “[i]llustrative decisions” noted by the Committee was Fallen. To 
the Committee, then, Fallen’s holding—that a prisoner who “‘did all he 
could’ to effect timely filing” by delivering the notice of appeal to prison 
authorities “well within the time fixed for appeal” had made a timely filing—
was implicit in the new Appellate Rules 3 and 4. But as the Warren Court era 
receded and textualist interpretation found new footing in the federal courts, 
would the Committee’s understanding prevail? That question would be 
answered in the 1988 case of Houston v. Lack. 
2. Houston v. Lack and the Explicit Prison Mailbox Rule 
Unlike Floyd Charles Fallen, who sought to take a direct appeal from his 
judgment of conviction, Prentiss Houston was a state prisoner seeking federal 
habeas relief (a civil remedy). So when Houston delivered his pro se notice 
of appeal to prison authorities three days before his appeal deadline ran out—
but the notice was not stamped “filed” by the district clerk until the day after 
the deadline—one question was whether the Fallen rule should extend 
beyond the context of criminal appeals. Another question was whether the 
plight of one such as Houston was better addressed in a rule specific to 
inmates or through some more generally applicable equitable provision. And 
a third question was whether the adjustment, if one were needed, should be 
accomplished via rule interpretation or rule amendment. In Houston, a 
closely-divided Court adopted for inmate filers the rule proposed by the 
Fallen concurrence—and it did so as a matter of interpreting Appellate Rules 
3 and 4. Houston, in turn, triggered rulemaking both by the Court itself and 
by the Appellate Rules Committee, and the resulting rules adopted and 
extended the Houston holding. 
In the oral argument of Houston’s case before the U.S. Supreme Court, a 
prominent issue was whether a prison mailbox rule was needed, or whether 
inmates’ filing difficulties could be addressed by means of generally 
applicable provisions already in the Appellate Rules. In some circumstances, 
a would-be appellant could move under Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) for an 
extension of the time to file an appeal; but the deadline for such a motion was 
                                                                                                                            
 120. FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory committee’s note to the 1967 Rule. 
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thirty days after the expiration of the underlying appeal time. And no one had 
noticed the timeliness issue in Houston’s case until the court of appeals raised 
it sua sponte “13 days after the time had expired to request an extension 
[under Rule] 4(a)(5).”121 Counsel for the Warden argued that the Court should 
refuse to recognize a special rule for inmate filings, and that any extreme 
cases of hardship could be addressed by allowing the district court to reopen 
the judgment under Civil Rule 60(b) in order to re-start the appeal time.122 In 
any event, the Warden argued, if the Court wished to adopt a special rule for 
inmate filings, the proper way to do it was via rulemaking rather than court 
decision.123 
The core theories of the majority and dissenting opinions in Houston likely 
were already taking shape when the Justices met in Conference. Justice 
Blackmun’s handwritten notes suggest that Justice Brennan—who would go 
on to write for the majority—argued that the Court should adopt the position 
taken by the Fallen concurrence.124 (It was not surprising that Justice Brennan 
should take this view, as he had joined that concurrence.125) “[O]nly a pro se 
prisoner is forced t[o] do this” i.e., to deliver his notice of appeal to the prison 
authorities for filing by mail—and prison authorities had a “tendency to be 
                                                                                                                            
 121. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 269 (1988). As Houston’s counsel noted at oral 
argument, although the district court had received Houston’s notice of appeal within the thirty-
day time period (after the appeal deadline) for seeking an extension under Rule 4(a)(5), a 1979 
amendment to Rule 4(a)(5) had changed the rule so that it required an actual motion. Houston’s 
counsel argued, though, that the Court should carry forward prior practice under the pre-1979 
version of Rule 4(a)(5), and hold that Houston’s notice of appeal met any requirement for a 
motion. As she explained: “prior to 1979 every single time that a pro se inmate’s notice of appeal 
occurred in that second thirty days, . . . it was interpreted to be a motion for an extension of 
time . . . .” Oral Argument at 19:30, Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (No. 87-5428), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-5428 [hereinafter Houston Oral Argument]. 
 122. See Houston Oral Argument, supra note 121, at 30:22 (arguing that “the Rule 60 
argument . . . would have [been] available to the Petitioner if . . . such an extraordinary thing had 
happened as the prison authorities deliberately interfered with his right to file an appeal”). The 
Court did not take the Warden up on this suggestion, and later precedents cast doubt on the 
availability of this solution, at least in most instances. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, § 3950.6 
& nn.41–42. 
 123. See Houston Oral Argument, supra note 121, at 45:30 (“We submit to you that any other 
rules that the Court might develop concerning . . . individuals in the Petitioner’s situation should 
come through the rulemaking process, not through judicial decision.”). 
 124. The top line of Justice Blackmun’s conference notes for Justice Brennan reads: “PS in 
Fallen.” Conference Notes, Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 22, 1988) 
[hereinafter Conference Notes], in Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Library of Congress, box 508, 
folder 7 (Houston v. Lack, No. 87-5428), in D.C. (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Blackmun 
Papers]. 
 125. See Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 144 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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dilatory.”126 Justice Scalia, in contrast, objected that the text of the rules could 
not encompass a prison mailbox principle: “filing means filing.”127 
Ultimately, the Court split 5–4 in Houston, and the reasoning of the Fallen 
concurrence became the Houston majority’s holding. Justice Brennan, 
writing for the Court, interpreted Appellate Rules 3 and 4 to support the 
conclusion “that petitioner . . . filed his notice within the requisite 30-day 
period when, three days before the deadline, he delivered the notice to prison 
authorities for forwarding to the District Court.”128 The Houston Court cast 
its reasoning in terms that appeared to apply to all pro se inmate litigants:  
The situation of prisoners seeking to appeal without the aid of 
counsel is unique. Such prisoners cannot take the steps other 
litigants can take to monitor the processing of their notices of appeal 
and to ensure that the court clerk receives and stamps their notices 
of appeal before the 30-day deadline.129  
Inmates, the Court explained, could not “personally travel to the 
courthouse to see that the notice is stamped ‘filed’ or to establish the date on 
which the court received the notice.”130 And while non-incarcerated litigants 
could hand mail directly to the carrier, and then call the court to check on 
receipt, and resort to in-person filing at the last moment if the mailed 
document is lost, “[p]ro se prisoners cannot take any of these precautions; 
nor, by definition, do they have lawyers who can take these precautions for 
them.”131 Moreover, “the pro se prisoner has no choice but to entrust the 
forwarding of his notice of appeal to prison authorities whom he cannot 
control or supervise and who may have every incentive to delay.”132 
In the Houston Court’s view, this reading not only served the important 
policy concerns noted above but also comported with the statutory and Rule 
text. Although civil appeals like Houston’s—unlike direct criminal appeals 
like Fallen’s—were subject to a statutory filing deadline, the relevant statute 
did not “define when a notice of appeal has been ‘filed’ or designate the 
person with whom it must be filed.”133 The Appellate Rules did “specify that 
the notice should be filed ‘with the clerk of the district court,’”134 but so long 
                                                                                                                            
 126. Conference Notes, supra note 124. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). 
 129. Id. at 270–71. 
 130. Id. at 271. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 272 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1982)). 
 134. Id. 
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as the notice was on its way to the district clerk,135 the Court saw no 
impediment to holding that the time of filing occurred prior to receipt by the 
clerk.136 As the Court pointed out, one of its own rules provided (subject to 
certain requirements) that attorney filings were complete upon mailing rather 
than receipt.137 
Justice Scalia, writing for himself and three other dissenters, subjected this 
reading to a withering critique. The Court’s holding, the dissenters 
complained, “obliterates the line between textual construction and textual 
enactment.”138 Not only was it implausible to interpret filing to mean mailing, 
but it was worse, they argued, for the same word in the same Rule to mean 
different things in different types of cases: “interpreting it to mean ‘delivered 
to the clerk or, if you are a prisoner, delivered to your warden’ is no more 
acceptable than any of an infinite number of variants . . . .”139 While the 
dissenters conceded that the prison mailbox rule adopted by the Court was “a 
good one,” they maintained that it should be adopted via “an amendment of 
the Rules.”140 
In fact, one might critique some aspects of both the majority and the 
dissenting opinions in Houston. Behind the scenes, at least one of the Justices 
in the majority seems to have expressed some qualms with the Court’s 
reading of the Rule text. Notes that Justice Blackmun jotted down a couple 
of days prior to the Houston oral argument suggest Justice Blackmun’s 
inclination to follow the view of the Fallen concurrence that the jailer was 
equivalent to the clerk of court.141 But, after listing some arguments in support 
of that position, he concluded the page of notes by saying: “This may b[e] a 
stretch, however.”142 On a draft of Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court—
circulated a few days before the issuance of the decision—the margin next to 
                                                                                                                            
 135. Cf. Wilder v. Chairman of Cent. Classification Bd., 926 F.2d 367, 370 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(“[T]he filing rule established by Houston does not apply when a prisoner gives a notice of appeal 
to prison authorities for delivery to an entity other than a federal court.”). 
 136. Houston, 487 U.S. at 273. 
 137. See id. (citing SUP. CT. R. 28.2 (current version at SUP. CT. R. 29.2)). 
 138. Id. at 277 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 284. 
 141. See handwritten page of notes in Justice Blackmun’s writing, dated “25 April 88,” in 
Blackmun Papers, supra note 124. The notes state in part: “PS conc: jailer = clerk o ct.” The notes 
then appear to list other possible options—remanding for a determination of when the court 
actually received Houston’s notice (“Cd RR +@ whe notice actually rec’d on ti”); or holding that 
Houston’s notice of appeal counted as a timely motion for extension of appeal time under 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) (“cd @ as a mtn for extension”). The notes then express a preference for 
adopting the Fallen concurrence’s approach rather than employing either of the other options: 
“But I wd follow PS[.]” 
 142. Id. 
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the paragraph explaining how an inmate’s filing could occur at a moment 
prior to the clerk’s receipt of the notice contained a wry comment in Justice 
Blackmun’s handwriting: “[A]mazing how we can arrive at results.”143 
On the other hand, one might also take issue with the dissent’s view that 
it was anathema to interpret Rules 3 and 4 flexibly when circumstances 
warranted. “The rationale of today’s decision,” the dissent commented 
disapprovingly, “is that any of various theoretically possible meanings of 
‘filed with the clerk’ may be adopted—even one as remote as ‘addressed to 
the clerk and given to the warden’—depending upon what equity requires.”144 
Quoting a dissent from an earlier case in which the Court had recognized 
“unique circumstances” that then justified relaxing the requirement for a 
timely notice of appeal, the Houston dissenters asserted: “Changes in rules 
whose inflexibility has turned out to work hardship should be effected by the 
process of amendment, not by ad hoc relaxations by this Court in particular 
cases.”145 
But, in fact, as the history noted above makes clear, those who framed 
original Appellate Rules 3 and 4 intended exactly that: The rulemakers cited 
Fallen prominently as an example of their directive (in the Committee Note) 
that courts should “dispense with literal compliance in cases in which it 
cannot fairly be exacted.”146 Unsurprisingly, Houston’s counsel had invoked 
this Committee Note both in her brief147 and, prominently, in her oral 
argument.148 Yet neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions mentioned 
                                                                                                                            
 143. Marked copy of first draft of Justice Brennan’s Opinion in Houston v. Lack (circulated 
May 19, 1988), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 124. 
 144. Houston, 487 U.S. at 280–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 283 (quoting Thompson v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 384, 390 
(1964) (Clark, J., dissenting)). Much later, the Court would hold that the “unique circumstances” 
doctrine it had recognized in cases such as Thompson cannot be used to forgive noncompliance 
with a deadline that is jurisdictional in nature. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) 
(“Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional 
requirement. Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional 
requirements, use of the ‘unique circumstances’ doctrine is illegitimate.”). Houston’s lawyer had 
offered the “unique circumstances” doctrine as an alternative ground for ruling in Houston’s 
favor; the Houston majority did not need to reach that argument. See Houston, 487 U.S. at 276 
n.4. The Houston dissenters would have taken the opportunity to overrule Harris and Thompson 
as applied to jurisdictional deadlines. See id. at 282 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 146. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 147. See Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (No. 87-5428), 
1987 WL 880908, at *10–11. 
 148. The first question that Houston’s counsel received was from Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
who asked whether Fallen involved a direct appeal. Houston Oral Argument, supra note 121, at 
2:37. To rebut the implication of this question (i.e., that Fallen should be confined to direct 
criminal appeals), Houston’s counsel observed that relevant language from Fallen “was quoted 
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the Note. Perhaps the majority felt no need to adduce further support for its 
holding. The dissenters’ failure to grapple with the Note cannot be explained 
as an application of textualist interpretive principles. Though Justice Scalia 
would, some years later, disclaim reliance on Committee Notes as he had 
already disclaimed reliance on statutory legislative history, he had not yet 
reached that view.149 Indeed, the Houston dissent itself relied on the 1979 
Committee Note to Appellate Rule 4(a)(5).150 
In any event, while the Court split sharply in Houston over the proper 
interpretation of existing Appellate Rules 3 and 4, the decision made clear 
that all of the Justices supported, as a policy matter, the idea of a special filing 
rule for inmates. It was, thus, unsurprising that rulemaking on two levels 
followed in Houston’s wake. Roughly a year and a half after deciding 
Houston, the Court adopted, in its Rule 29.2, a codification of the Houston 
principle.151 A few years thereafter, amendments to Appellate Rules 4 and 25 
codified the prison mailbox rule for notices of appeal and for filings in the 
courts of appeals.152 These developments permit a comparison of the 
decisional and rulemaking modes. Houston provided the impetus for the rule 
changes, and it is impossible to tell whether the rule changes would have 
resulted without such a nudge from the Court. But the rulemakers, in turn, 
provided distinctive value by incorporating information gathered from 
stakeholders in a deliberative, iterative process. 
Soon after the Houston decision, the Chair of the Standing Committee—
Judge Joseph Weis—asked all of the advisory committees to consider 
amending the national rules to provide generally for a “mailbox” filing rule.153 
Judge Weis’s proposal appears to have been motivated not only by the ruling 
                                                                                                                            
by the Advisory Committee . . . particularly under Rule 3 . . . in conjunction with four other cases, 
one of which was a civil case.” Id. at 2:41. 
 149. By 1995, Justice Scalia had concluded that it was improper to rely on Committee Notes 
to show the rulemakers’ intent: “I have previously acquiesced in . . . , and indeed myself engaged 
in . . . , similar use of the Advisory Committee Notes. More mature consideration has persuaded 
me that is wrong.” Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). See generally Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: 
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1163–64 (2002) 
(discussing the evolution of Justice Scalia’s techniques for interpreting the rules). 
 150. See Houston, 487 U.S. at 283 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 151. See SUP. CT. R. 29.2. 
 152. See FED. R. APP. P. 4, 25. 
 153. See ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE MEETING ON OCTOBER 
26, 1989, at 5 (1989) [hereinafter OCTOBER 1989 MINUTES], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP10-1989-min.pdf (“The proposal that 
Judge Weis asked all of the Advisory Committees to consider suggested fundamental rethinking 
of the concept of ‘filing.’”). 
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in Houston but—more generally—by the Supreme Court’s then-recent 
adoption of a mailbox rule for attorney filings in the Court: 
The proposal noted that the Supreme Court recently redefined the 
term “filing” so that a document is deemed timely filed if it is 
deposited in a United States post office or mailbox within the time 
allowed for filing, so long as a member of the Supreme Court bar 
files a notarized statement detailing the mailing and stating that to 
the attorney’s knowledge the mailing took place on a particular date 
within the permitted time. The suggestion was to use a similar 
approach in all the rules and, in addition, to permit proof of 
transmission by means even more expeditious than the U.S. mail. 
With regard to the particular problem of prisoner filings, it was 
further suggested that delivery to a custodial official within the time 
allowed for filing shall be deemed timely filing.154 
The idea of adopting a general “mailbox” filing rule appears to have 
attracted little enthusiasm. No such rule made its way into the Civil or 
Criminal Rules, and though the Appellate Rules already included a “mailbox” 
rule for briefs, the Appellate Rules Committee quickly decided not to expand 
that into a more general “mailbox” filing rule.155 
However, the Appellate Rules Committee decided to move forward with 
a rule specific to inmate filers. The Committee’s initially stated rationale was 
somewhat cryptic: the minutes reflect that the Committee “favor[ed] adoption 
of a rule governing the filing of papers by prisoners believing that a rule 
would ease the administrative problems.”156 The minutes leave unclear 
whether the Committee was concerned with administrative problems faced 
by inmates, or with administrative problems caused by a perceived difference 
between the existing Rule text and the principle enunciated in Houston. At a 
later meeting, one Committee member would voice the latter concern.157 
The rulemaking response to Houston illustrated an institutional advantage 
to the rulemaking process: during the drafting of new Appellate Rules 4(c) 
                                                                                                                            
 154. Id. at 5–6. 
 155. See id. at 6 (“The Committee did not favor a general mailbox rule, although it did think 
that the current mailbox provision in Fed. R. App. P. 25(a) for filing briefs should be retained.”). 
Appellate Rule 25(a)’s mailbox filing rule for briefs provided a model for Bankruptcy Rule 
8011(a)(2)(B), which sets a similar mailbox filing rule for briefs filed in appeals from a 
bankruptcy court to a district court or bankruptcy appellate panel. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 
8011(a)(2)(B).  
 156. See OCTOBER 1989 MINUTES, supra note 153, at 6. 
 157. See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, MINUTES OF THE 
OCTOBER 23, 1990 MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 17 (1990) [hereinafter OCTOBER 1990 MINUTES], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP10-1990-min.pdf. 
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and 25(a), the Committee or its members took the opportunity to consult a 
number of relevant stakeholders—the federal Bureau of Prisons, other federal 
agencies,158 state prison officials, and the circuit clerks.159 Those inquiries 
produced details concerning federal Bureau of Prisons policy, as well as 
observations concerning the diversity of practices in state correctional 
institutions.160 And the Department of Justice ultimately expressed its support 
for the proposed new rules.161 
While the Appellate Rules Committee undertook this broad research, it 
also took care to give attention to the Supreme Court’s corresponding rule. 
Shortly after the Appellate Rules Committee had begun considering possible 
rulemaking responses to Houston v. Lack, the Supreme Court adopted 
amendments to its own rules that included, in Rule 29.2, a version of the 
prison mailbox rule.162 By April 1991, the Appellate Rules Committee was 
considering a revised draft rule proposal that “closely track[ed] the language 
in the Supreme Court’s Rule 29.2.”163 So, for example, though a prior 
Appellate Rules Committee draft would have limited the prison mailbox rule 
to pro se inmates, the new draft dropped that limitation in deference to the 
broader approach taken by the Supreme Court’s rule.164 
The Committee also decided to broaden the new rules’ application beyond 
the holding in Houston in two further ways. First, the Committee decided to 
extend the prison mailbox rule not only to the filing of notices of appeal but 
also to all filings in the courts of appeals.165 Second, the Committee decided 
these new rules should encompass inmates in institutions other than prisons 
                                                                                                                            
 158. See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, MINUTES OF THE 
APRIL 17, 1991, MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 26 (1991) [hereinafter APRIL 1991 MINUTES], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP04-1991-min.pdf (reporting that a DOJ 
representative expressed the Department’s wish to consult INS and HHS for their views on the 
proposed inmate-mailbox rule). 
 159. See OCTOBER 1990 MINUTES, supra note 157, at 16–17 (noting that the Committee’s 
prior Chair, Judge Jon O. Newman, had “contacted Mr. Michael Quinlan of the Bureau of Prisons 
and several state prison officials to inquire whether there is anything that the committee needs to 
know about mail collection in the prisons”); id. at 18 (“Mr. St. Vrain [the Eighth Circuit Clerk] 
was asked to consult with his fellow clerks about their experience with prisoner filings and the 
Justice Department was asked to consult with prisons about their experience.”). 
 160. See id. at 17 (“The federal prison . . . policy requires a collection box for legal mail and 
further requires that the mail be collected and date stamped each day. The state prisons have a 
variety of practices.”). 
 161. See APRIL 1991 MINUTES, supra note 158, at 25–26. 
 162. See SUP. CT. R. 29.2. 
 163. See APRIL 1991 MINUTES, supra note 158, at 26. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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and jails—including, for example, those confined in mental hospitals166 or 
held by the immigration authorities. The new Rule 4(c) and revised Rule 
25(a) took effect December 1, 1993.167 
The implicit prison mailbox rule of Fallen and the original Committee 
Note to Appellate Rule 3 had officially evolved into the explicit inmate-
mailbox rule that is now found, as amended, in Appellate Rules 4(c) and 
25(a)(2)(C). These rules address the distinctive difficulties that inmates may 
face with respect to the timing of their outgoing mail to the court. But they 
do not address the question of possible institutional delays in the processing 
of incoming inmate mail. I take up that question in the next section. 
3. A Prison Mailbox Rule for Incoming Mail? 
Houston addressed one specific issue—the timeliness of an inmate’s 
notice of appeal. The Appellate Rules Committee tackled, by rulemaking, the 
additional question of how to date other filings made by inmates in the courts 
of appeals. In due course, the Criminal Rules Committee adopted provisions 
in the rules for habeas and § 2255 proceedings that mirrored the Appellate 
Rules’ inmate-filing provisions.168 Though no similar provisions were 
adopted in the Civil or Criminal Rules, the courts have applied Houston to 
district-court filings not expressly covered by any national inmate-filing 
rules. But all of these developments addressed an institution’s delay in 
processing outgoing mail. What of prison delay in providing an inmate with 
incoming mail?169 Where an inmate’s deadline runs from entry of a court 
order or judgment, or where the deadline runs from service (and the service 
                                                                                                                            
 166. See OCTOBER 1989 MINUTES, supra note 153, at 6–7. 
 167. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(c), 25(a) (1993), in 147 F.R.D. 287, 301–02, 311–12 (1993). 
 168. More recently, similar prison mailbox provisions have been added to the rules for 
bankruptcy appeals to a district court or bankruptcy appellate panel. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 
8002(c), 8011(a)(2)(C). 
 169. A somewhat related question concerns the adequacy of legal notice sent by the 
government to an incarcerated litigant. In Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002), a 
closely divided Court rejected an inmate’s due process objection, which was grounded in the 
inmate’s claim that he never received a civil forfeiture notice sent by the federal government to 
him by certified mail at the federal prison in which he was incarcerated. The majority held that 
the method of notice was reasonable under the circumstances. See id. at 170. The dissenting 
Justices, relying partly on Houston, argued that  
[a] prisoner receives his mail only through the combined good offices of two 
bureaucracies which he can neither monitor nor control: The postal service 
must move the mail from the sender to the prison, and the prison must then 
move the mail from the prison gates to the prisoner’s hands. That the first 
system can be relied upon does not imply that the second is acceptable. 
Id. at 179 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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is complete upon mailing), a prison’s delay in providing mail to an inmate 
could cause the inmate to miss the deadline. 
In this section, I consider the extent to which the rules and caselaw address 
this issue, and I note the rulemakers’ consideration—but decision not to 
proceed with—additional rule amendments directed toward the issue. To 
provide a framework for this discussion, I first survey provisions in the rules 
that provide avenues for relief for an inmate who belatedly received a 
decision that the inmate wishes to appeal or a document served in connection 
with an appeal. I then review rulemakers’ and courts’ consideration of ways 
to supplement those avenues for relief by applying the teachings of Houston 
to the context of late-arriving inmate mail. I conclude that current law 
addresses many, but not all, of the difficulties that inmates may incur as a 
result of such delays. 
Under the current rules, an inmate who wishes to take a civil appeal and 
who does not timely receive notice of the judgment has two potential avenues 
for relief. Suppose that the district court sends notice of the entry of the 
judgment to a self-represented inmate, but that that notice reaches the inmate 
beyond the time for taking an appeal from the judgment.170 If the inmate 
learns of the judgment shortly after the time for appeal has run out, the inmate 
could move in the district court for an extension of appeal time under 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(5). The late arrival of the notice of entry of judgment 
should constitute “good cause” that would justify the district court in granting 
such a motion—but only if the inmate moves under Rule 4(a)(5) within thirty 
days after the expiration of the appeal deadline.171 
If the inmate learns of the judgment too late to move under Appellate Rule 
4(a)(5), then Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)—added in 1991—could still provide 
relief. By definition, in this scenario the inmate would meet Rule 4(a)(6)(A)’s 
requirement concerning late notice.172 The inmate’s motion deadline under 
Rule 4(a)(6) is two-fold: the motion must be made within fourteen days after 
the inmate receives notice of the entry under Civil Rule 77(d),173 and the 
                                                                                                                            
 170. In most cases, the relevant deadline would be thirty days from entry of the judgment. 
See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). In cases to which certain federal government entities are parties 
(an example would be a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), the relevant deadline would be sixty 
days from entry of the judgment. See id. 4(a)(1)(B). 
 171. See supra note 121. 
 172. Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(A) requires a court finding “that the moving party did not receive 
notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment or order sought 
to be appealed within 21 days after entry.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6)(A). 
 173. Id. 4(a)(6)(B). Notice under Civil Rule 77(d) must be served (by the district clerk or a 
party) under Civil Rule 5(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(1). Civil Rule 5(b) sets a range of allowable 
methods of service. See id. 5(b). 
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motion must also be filed no later than 180 days after entry of the judgment.174 
Assuming that the movant meets those deadlines, relief is available if “the 
court finds that no party would be prejudiced.”175 
A criminal defendant who receives notice of the entry of a criminal 
judgment too late to file the notice of appeal within the deadline set by 
Appellate Rule 4(b)(1)(A)176 could seek an extension, so long as only a short 
time has passed. Rule 4(b)(4) provides that  
[u]pon a finding of excusable neglect or good cause, the district 
court may—before or after the time has expired, with or without 
motion and notice—extend the time to file a notice of appeal for a 
period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time 
otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(b).177  
Rule 4(b) contains no analogue to Rule 4(a)(6)’s provision concerning late 
notice of the entry of judgment; one explanation for the difference may be 
that, as to many judgments that are subject to Rule 4(b)(1)(A)’s appeal 
deadline, the Criminal Rules already provide safeguards for the criminal 
defendant. As to convictions (after a not guilty plea) and sentences, the 
district judge must advise the defendant of the defendant’s right to appeal178 
and the right to seek in forma pauperis status on appeal,179 and the district 
clerk must file the notice of appeal for the defendant if the defendant requests 
it.180 Another distinction181 between civil and criminal appeals is that while 
civil appeal deadlines are jurisdictional (and thus not subject to equitable 
exceptions), Appellate Rule 4(b)(1)(A)’s deadline for appeals by criminal 
                                                                                                                            
 174. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6)(B). 
 175. Id. 4(a)(6)(C). 
 176. Id. 4(b)(1)(A) (“In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be 
filed . . . within 14 days after the later of: (i) the entry of either the judgment or the order being 
appealed; or (ii) the filing of the government's notice of appeal.”). 
 177. Id. 4(b)(4). 
 178. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j)(1)(A) (“If the defendant pleaded not guilty and was convicted, 
after sentencing the court must advise the defendant of the right to appeal the conviction.”); id. 
32(j)(1)(B) (“After sentencing—regardless of the defendant’s plea—the court must advise the 
defendant of any right to appeal the sentence.”). 
 179. See id. 32(j)(1)(C). 
 180. See id. 32(j)(2) (“If the defendant so requests, the clerk must immediately prepare and 
file a notice of appeal on the defendant’s behalf.”). 
 181. A further distinction is that an inmate seeking direct review of a federal criminal 
judgment is entitled to the assistance of counsel, and counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of 
appeal for the inmate would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. That in turn would justify 
collateral relief in the event that the inmate did not manage to timely file a notice of appeal from 
the judgment of conviction. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, § 3950.8 & n.59. 
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defendants is regarded as nonjurisdictional182 (such that equitable 
considerations—like a prison’s delay in delivering notice of entry of a 
judgment—might appropriately be taken into account when applying the 
deadline). 
As to appellate deadlines that run from service of a document rather than 
from entry of a judgment, Appellate Rule 26(b) authorizes the court of 
appeals to extend those deadlines “for good cause,”183 and an institution’s 
delay in delivering the document to the inmate should presumably qualify as 
good cause. Rule 26(b) expressly excludes from this extension provision the 
deadline for filing a notice of appeal;184 thus, Rule 4’s provisions (noted 
above) rather than Rule 26(b) apply to appeal deadlines. Rule 26(b) also 
excludes from its extension provision the deadline for filing a petition for 
review of agency action.185 Rule 15, which governs the filing of such 
petitions, includes no provision for extensions of time; it states merely that 
the petition must be filed “within the time prescribed by law.”186 
In sum, Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)’s reopening provision, the extension 
provisions in Appellate Rules 4(a)(5) and 4(b)(4), and additional protections 
in the Criminal Rules help to mitigate the most significant potential hardship 
that could result from prison delay in delivering mail. And Appellate Rule 
26(b) authorizes the court of appeals to extend many other deadlines for 
“good cause.” But relief under those provisions is not guaranteed, and the 
rules do not provide similar relief for an inmate who petitions a court of 
appeals for review of an agency action. 
The Appellate Rules Committee has periodically considered the problem 
that arises when an inmate fails to receive notice of a court decision in time 
to comply with the deadline for seeking review of that decision. The 
Committee received a suggestion that it consider the problem in relation to 
reports by magistrate judges,187 and it turned to this topic in the early 1990s. 
Judge Dolores Sloviter, who made the suggestion, had noted “a surprising 
                                                                                                                            
 182. See supra note 88 (discussing this distinction between civil and criminal appeal 
deadlines). 
 183. FED. R. APP. P. 26(b). 
 184. Id. 26(b)(1). 
 185. Id. 26(b)(2). 
 186. Id. 15(a). 
 187. See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, MEETING OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 13 (1986), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP12-1986-min.pdf. 
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dearth of precedent” concerning “the recurring problem of service of legal 
mail on pro se prisoners.”188 
The Committee’s then-reporter, Carol Ann Mooney, observed that the 
problem Judge Sloviter had pointed out was “the converse of the one the 
Committee addressed with the proposed amendments based upon Houston v. 
Lack.”189 As Professor Mooney noted:  
Prisoners are at a distinct disadvantage whenever they must act 
within a certain time after being served because service may be 
accomplished by mailing. Prisoners have no control over their 
whereabouts; transfers can delay their mail delivery. Even without 
delays caused by transfers, prisoners have no control over when 
prison officials actually deliver their mail.190  
Additionally, mail entering prisons may be delayed by security screening 
procedures.191 But, Professor Mooney suggested, the solution to the specific 
problem identified by Judge Sloviter (concerning untimely receipt of 
magistrates’ reports and recommendations) might lie outside the purview of 
the Appellate Rules Committee.192 
Nonetheless, responding to “some sentiment that the Committee should 
try to address the general problem of service on institutionalized persons,” 
Professor Mooney prepared proposed amendments that would have made 
service on an inmate complete upon receipt (rather than mailing)193 and that 
                                                                                                                            
 188. Grandison v. Moore, 786 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1986). Grandison involved a prisoner 
who filed his objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation late because he did 
not timely receive the report and recommendation (the mailing was sent to a facility to which he 
had been temporarily transferred, but reached that facility only after he had already been 
transferred back). See id. at 148. The court of appeals held that the then-ten-day limit for filing 
objections was not jurisdictional, and that the district court had abused its discretion in rejecting 
the inmate’s objections on timeliness grounds. See id. at 148–49. 
 189. Memorandum from Carol Ann Mooney, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Appellate 
Rules, to Kenneth F. Ripple, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules 2 (Oct. 5, 1992), in 
ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, AGENDA: MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
APPELLATE RULES 182, 183 (1992) [hereinafter Mooney 1992 Memorandum], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP1992-10.pdf. 
 190. Id. at 1. 
 191. See Memorandum from Carol Ann Mooney, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Appellate 
Rules, to Kenneth F. Ripple, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules 1 (Mar. 25, 1993), in 
ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, TENTATIVE AGENDA: MEETING OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 131, 131 (1993) [hereinafter Mooney 1993 Memorandum], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP1993-04.pdf. 
 192. See Mooney 1992 Memorandum, supra note 189, at 183. 
 193. See Mooney 1993 Memorandum, supra note 191, at 2, 4 (sketching an addition to 
Appellate Rule 25(c) to state that “[s]ervice on an inmate confined in an institution is not 
complete, however, until the copy is delivered to the inmate”). 
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would have provided a mechanism for an inmate to show timeliness (of an 
apparently late filing) where the inmate’s deadline ran from service.194 The 
Committee sent the drafts, for review and comment, “to the Chief Judges of 
the circuits, to the Committee of Staff Attorneys, and to the Advisory 
Committee of Defenders.”195 The Committee of Defenders did not respond to 
the inquiry;196 the Staff Attorneys who responded voiced concern that the 
proposals would be difficult to administer;197 and the appellate judges who 
responded were divided roughly evenly in support of and opposition to the 
proposals.198 Professor Mooney explained: “Those who oppose the 
amendments generally do so because they believe that current authority and 
procedures allow them to adequately protect an inmate’s interests and that 
the proposed amendments will create delay and uncertainty.”199 In addition, 
opponents noted that “there is no mechanism for knowing when an inmate 
receives a document so both the court and opposing parties will not know 
when to expect responsive pleadings.”200 In April 1994, after discussing this 
input, the Appellate Rules Committee voted unanimously to abandon the 
proposed amendments.201 
As the discussion earlier in this Part illustrates, rulemaking is one avenue 
for addressing the logistical difficulties faced by inmates; caselaw is another 
such avenue. The Third Circuit’s precedential caselaw and nonprecedential 
decisions in some other circuits extend Houston’s principle to incoming 
                                                                                                                            
 194. See id. at 5 (sketching a possible new Appellate Rule 26(d) to state that “[w]henever an 
inmate confined in an institution is required or permitted to act within a prescribed period after 
service of paper upon the inmate, timely action may be shown by a notarized statement or by a 
declaration (in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746) setting forth the date the inmate received the 
paper”). 
 195. ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES APPELLATE PROCEDURE, MINUTES OF THE MEETING 
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 22 (1994) 
[hereinafter APRIL 1994 MINUTES], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ap4-
25.pdf. 
 196. See Memorandum from Carol Ann Mooney, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Appellate 
Rules, to James K. Logan, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules 9 (Mar. 24, 1994), in 
ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, TENTATIVE AGENDA: MEETING OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 57, 65 (1994), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/AP1994-04.pdf [hereinafter Mooney 1994 
Memorandum] (misdated “March 24, 1993”). 
 197. See id. at 7 (“Staff attorneys from seven circuits provided responses. They generally 
oppose the draft amendments because they do not provide a way of knowing when, or whether, 
service has occurred.”). 
 198. See id. at 4 (“Of the seven circuits: three oppose the amendments; three support them; 
and the sixth circuit judges split rather evenly . . . .”). 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See APRIL 1994 MINUTES, supra note 195, at 22–23. 
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inmate mail so as to protect inmates from delays in receiving notice of entry 
of judgments that they wish to appeal. The pathmarking case in the Third 
Circuit is United States v. Grana.202 As the Grana court explained:  
The teaching of Houston is that prison delay beyond the litigant’s 
control cannot fairly be used in computing time for appeal. We 
perceive no difference between delay in transmitting the prisoner’s 
papers to the court and transmitting the court’s final judgment to 
him so that he may prepare his appeal.203  
Though subsequent decisions exhibited some inconsistency in applying 
Grana,204 the Third Circuit has clarified that Grana’s rule continues to govern 
at least some instances when the inmate’s late receipt of notice of entry is 
attributable to prison delay—but that Grana is inapplicable if the late receipt 
stems from fault by actors other than the prison (such as the clerk’s office or 
the mail service).205 
Grana was a criminal appeal, and whether Grana governs the date of entry 
of judgment against an inmate in a civil case is unclear. The Third Circuit has 
applied Grana to determine the date of “entry” of an order denying a 
postjudgment motion within the meaning of Civil Rule 59(e)—an inquiry that 
determined whether the postjudgment motion was timely, and eligible to toll 
the time to appeal the underlying judgment, under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4).206 
But in Baker v. United States, the Third Circuit refused to apply Grana to 
determine the date of “entry” of a civil judgment within the meaning of 
                                                                                                                            
 202. 864 F.2d 312, 312 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 203. Id. at 316. 
 204. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, § 3950.12 (discussing, inter alia, United States v. 
Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2003), and Poole v. Family Court, 368 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 205. Grana’s applicability depends “on the nature of the alleged delay.” Long v. Atl. City 
Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 443 (3d Cir. 2012). The Long court reconciled Fiorelli—which had 
followed Grana—and Poole—which had refused to follow Grana—thus:  
In Fiorelli, the delay in the prisoner’s receipt of the order was allegedly the 
result of the prison’s handling of the mail. It was, in other words a classic 
prison delay case, after the manner of Grana. In Poole, by contrast, the delay 
allegedly was caused by the clerk’s office and did not stem from actions or 
omissions by prison officials. 
Id. at 443. 
 206. See United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We see no reason why 
Grana’s exclusion of prison delays from the time limits of jurisdictionally sensitive filings should 
not apply to motions for reconsideration. The timeliness of a motion under either Civil Rule 59 
or 60 is critical to appellate jurisdiction.”). 
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Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107207—an inquiry that (as noted 
above) determines whether the would-be appellant is eligible to have the 
appeal time reopened after late receipt of the notice of entry. In refusing to 
extend Grana to this context, the court of appeals relied both on the fact that 
the deadlines for civil appeals are statutory and, thus, jurisdictional,208 and 
also on the fact that Rule 4(a)(6) and § 2107 refer to both entry and receipt—
making it inappropriate, in the court’s view, to read “entry” to encompass the 
idea of actual receipt.209 
Baker’s reasoning brings into question whether Grana would govern the 
question of when a civil judgment was “entered” for purposes of Appellate 
Rule 4(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). Rule 4(a)(1) and § 2107(a) refer only 
to “entry” and not to “receipt,” thus permitting the argument that one of the 
Baker court’s rationales does not apply. But the Baker court’s concern about 
the jurisdictional nature of statutory appeal deadlines would apply equally to 
Rule 4(a)(1) and § 2107(a). One possible response would be that § 2107(a) 
does not define “entry”; such an argument would recall the Houston Court’s 
reliance on the fact that § 2107 did not define “filing.”210 But the definition 
of the statutory term “entry” might be less flexible now than the definition of 
“filing” was in 1988, given the 1991 addition of § 2107(c), with its use of 
both the term “receipt” and the term “entry.”211 Perhaps ironically, the rule 
and statute amendments designed to mitigate problems stemming from late 
receipt may have helped to close off additional flexibility in the treatment of 
late-arriving inmate mail. 
So far, the Third Circuit’s approach seems to have gained little traction in 
other circuits. Two courts have adopted or considered a similar approach in 
nonprecedential opinions,212 but two other circuits have rejected the Grana 
                                                                                                                            
 207. See Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 459–60 (3d Cir. 2012). The term used in 
§ 2107(c) was “entry,” while the operative term used in Rule 4(a)(6)(B) was “entered”; but that 
difference seems immaterial to the court’s analysis. 
 208. See id. at 457. 
 209. See id. at 460. 
 210. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 272 (1988). 
 211. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2012). 
 212. See Bingham v. District of Columbia, No. 95-7096, 1996 WL 103739, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 
Jan. 18, 1996) (adopting Grana’s approach in the context of determining the date of entry of a 
civil judgment for purposes of determining whether a postjudgment motion was timely within the 
meaning of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)); see also Brown v. Riverside Corr. Facility, No. 90-1097, 
1992 WL 102504, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 1992) (“[E]ven adopting Grana’s application of the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Houston, the facts of this case preclude salvaging the notice of 
appeal [because] . . . [e]xcluding the delay attributable to the prison authorities, a total of six days, 
Brown’s notice of appeal was filed twenty days after the thirty-day filing period had 
expired . . . .”). 
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approach in precedential decisions in civil appeals. In Jenkins v. Burtzloff, the 
Tenth Circuit relied in part on the fact that the Civil and Appellate Rules 
define “entry” in a fashion that does not encompass late receipt by an 
inmate,213 and in part on the view that reading “entry” to encompass such a 
late receipt would run counter to § 2107’s “plain meaning” and would cause 
“absurd” results when a judgment was received by multiple parties on 
different dates.214 In Wilder v. Chairman of Central Classification Board, the 
Fourth Circuit (in an alternative holding) refused to apply Grana to a civil 
case because the deadline for civil appeals is typically thirty days and the 
Wilder court viewed Grana as resting on the exigencies created by the shorter 
(then, ten-day) deadline for a criminal defendant’s appeal.215 
The Appellate Rules Committee, which periodically monitors circuit splits 
concerning the Appellate Rules, recently considered whether to study the 
question of a reverse-mailbox rule for inmates.216 At the Committee’s fall 
2016 meeting a representative of the Department of Justice reported that the 
Bureau of Prisons had expressed two concerns when consulted about the 
possibility of a reverse-mailbox rule for inmates: “First, it would be difficult 
to track and provide evidence of when an inmate actually receives notice of 
the district court’s entry of judgment. Second, a prisoner’s assertion of a delay 
could be burdensome to prison staff.”217 And a committee member pointed 
out that Grana predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowles v. Russell 
(which held statutory appeal deadlines to be jurisdictional and not susceptible 
to equitable exceptions).218 Thus, while it is currently unclear whether the 
                                                                                                                            
 213. See Jenkins v. Burtzloff, 69 F.3d 460, 461–62 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[Appellate] Rule 
4(a)(7) defines entry, providing that a judgment or order is ‘entered’ under Rule 4(a) when entered 
in compliance with [Civil] Rules 58 and 79(a). Rule 79(a), in turn, provides that the clerk shall 
keep a book in which all ‘orders, verdicts, and judgments shall be entered.’ The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the Rules to provide that entry means entry on the docket.”). 
 214. See id. at 462. 
 215. Wilder v. Chairman of Cent. Classification Bd., 926 F.2d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 1991). As 
an alternative ground, the court noted the fact that the would-be appellant had dated his notice of 
appeal “nine days after the issuance of the judgment and order,” showing that he must have 
received notice of the judgment by that point. Id. 
 216. See Memorandum from Gregory E. Maggs, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, to Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules 3 (Sept. 25, 2016), in ADVISORY 
COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, AGENDA FOR FALL 2016 MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
APPELLATE RULES 163, 165 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-10-
appellate-agenda-book_0.pdf (noting that “[a] circuit split currently exists on the issue of whether 
the period for filing a notice of appeal may be extended if prison officials delay in notifying an 
inmate of the entry of a judgment or appealable decision”). 
 217. See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES APPELLATE PROCEDURE, MINUTES OF THE FALL 
2016 MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
8 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fall_2016_appellate_rules_committee_
meeting_minutes_0.pdf. 
 218. See id.; see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2007). 
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Committee will decide to study the matter further, it seems likely that the 
concerns expressed during the Committee’s prior consideration of the topic 
are likely to recur, supplemented now by the Court’s modern emphasis on the 
jurisdictional nature of statutory appeal deadlines. 
 
* * * 
 
The Appellate Rules, then, accomplished significant advances in the 
procedures for inmate appeals, and the Houston decision and its aftermath 
further developed the distinctive treatment of such appeals. But the Appellate 
Rules and their interpretation tell only part of the story. To sketch a more 
complete picture, the next Part surveys local circuit case management 
practices and national changes implemented by Congress through legislation. 
II. DOCKET MANAGEMENT IN THE COURTS AND IN CONGRESS 
If the 1960s saw a flurry of work designed to promote court access, the 
following decades witnessed a burgeoning federal docket. Efforts to manage 
that docket ensued, both in the courts and in Congress—and, as I summarize 
here, those efforts profoundly affected inmate appeals. In Part II.A, I discuss 
case management practices adopted by the circuits themselves. In Part II.B, I 
recount two pieces of 1990s legislation designed to stem the tide of inmate 
appeals. These developments share at least one broad characteristic: they 
transformed the processing of inmate appeals without placing more than a 
light mark on the Appellate Rules themselves. For inmate appeals, at any rate, 
the Appellate Rules cannot be regarded as a comprehensive guide to actual 
practice. 
A. Circuits’ Approaches to Case Management 
Measures to handle a rising appellate caseload began to take shape even 
before the adoption of the Appellate Rules, and they took firm root thereafter. 
In this Part, drawing on the work of Professor Marin Levy, I summarize the 
development of those measures and note the ways in which they currently 
affect the processing of pro se inmate appeals. 
As Professor Levy recounts, “Between 1950 and 1978, the annual filings 
per judge in the federal courts of appeals nearly doubled . . . . Without the 
ability to increase their ranks or limit their jurisdiction, appellate judges had 
only one way to respond to their burgeoning caseload: adopt practices 
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designed to increase judicial efficiency.”219 By the mid-1970s, a panel 
appointed to study the federal courts of appeals reported: 
[W]hat might once have been considered basic ingredients of the 
appellate process—oral argument, written opinions, a conference of 
the judges—are absent in great numbers of cases. For example, in 
several circuits one-half of all appeals are being decided without 
any oral argument. . . . Opinion writing practices have changed no 
less dramatically. A signed opinion is no longer the norm, even for 
cases decided after hearing or submission. . . . Of greater 
significance is the extent to which decisions are rendered without 
any indication of the reasoning impelling the result.220 
Related to the decline in oral argument were innovations in appeal 
screening: “[C]ourts of appeals began to develop screening processes, 
whereby either staff or the judges themselves reviewed cases to determine 
whether they could be disposed of without oral argument.”221 And a need for 
screening meant a need for staff:  
[C]ourts of appeals began to receive funding for staff clerks . . . to 
review certain classes of cases. In 1982, Congress officially 
authorized the creation of staff attorney offices, which were 
designed to review pro se prisoner cases. As appellate filings 
continued to grow, the number and role of staff attorneys 
expanded.222 
The circuits also “began to adopt mediation or conference programs to help 
parties either settle their cases or narrow the range of issues on appeal.”223 
These trends have continued to the present day, and (with the exception of 
mediation programs224) these case management measures significantly affect 
pro se inmate appeals. A 1980s study of the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits found “that appeals decided without argument are likely to arise out 
of civil rights cases, prisoner petitions, Social Security appeals, and pro se 
                                                                                                                            
 219. Levy, supra note 4, at 321 22 (footnotes omitted). 
 220. Roman L. Hruska et al., Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System 
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 247 (1975). 
 221. Levy, supra note 4, at 322. 
 222. Id. at 323 (footnotes omitted). 
 223. Id. at 323 24. 
 224. See, e.g., LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS 16 (2d ed. 2011) (“Generally, in all of the circuits, pro se, prisoner rights, 
social security, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (federal custody), and habeas corpus cases are not eligible for 
settlement or mediation conferences.”). 
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appeals in general.”225 More recent studies, likewise, confirm that pro se 
inmate appeals tend to be decided without oral argument in at least a number 
of circuits.226 A late-1970s study found a “disproportionately low rate of 
publication of opinions for some types of litigation, such as prisoners’ 
petitions, Social Security cases, and appeals in forma pauperis.”227 A study of 
twelve circuits (the Federal Circuit was excluded) found that among cases 
decided on the merits in fiscal year 1997 by a court of appeals, the likelihood 
of a published opinion was only twenty-three percent—but that proportion 
rose to thirty-two percent if only “[c]ases with counsel” were considered.228 
Recent studies also confirm the continuing prominent role of staff attorneys 
in processing pro se inmate appeals (though the details of staff attorneys’ 
roles vary across circuits).229 
The Appellate Rules tell the reader little to nothing about these docket 
management measures. Appellate Rule 34(a)(2) provides the formal structure 
for decisions to dispense with oral argument, but sets only a relatively 
abstract standard.230 Appellate Rule 32.1 bars courts from restricting the 
citation of unpublished opinions,231 but does not require or set standards for 
the publication of opinions or affect the precedential status (usually, none) of 
unpublished opinions. The processing of inmate appeals, then, is shaped not 
only by the national rules but also by local circuit practices. And 
superimposed on both those frameworks are requirements that Congress has 
set by statute—a topic to which I turn in the next section. 
                                                                                                                            
 225. Joe S. Cecil & Donna Stienstra, Deciding Cases Without Argument: An Examination of 
Four Courts of Appeals, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING APPEALS IN FEDERAL COURTS 397, 
428 (Michael Tonry & Robert A. Katzmann eds., 1988). 
 226. Professor Levy reports that oral argument is typically not employed for pro se appeals 
in the First, Third, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits, but that “[i]n the Second Circuit, some pro se appeals 
do receive argument.” Levy, supra note 4, at 380. Based on a study of practices in all thirteen 
circuits, Federal Judicial Center researchers report that “[c]ase characteristics that are likely to 
favor oral argument include presence of counsel, novel issues, complex issues, extensive records, 
and numerous parties.” HOOPER ET AL., supra note 224, at 18. 
 227. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in 
the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 225, 
at 455, 485 86. 
 228. COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 
22 23 (1998), http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/final/appstruc.pdf. 
 229. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 224, at 39; Levy, supra note 4, at 380 (summarizing 
variation in the ways in which the First, Second, Third, and D.C. Circuits use staff attorneys in 
connection with pro se appeals). 
 230. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2). 
 231. See id. 32.1(a). 
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B. Legislating Docket Control 
The circuits’ management techniques transformed the processing of pro 
se inmate appeals, but did not restrict their numbers. Professor Margo 
Schlanger describes the trends in inmate civil rights filings thus:  
A steep increase in prisoner civil rights litigation combined in the 
1970s with a steep increase in incarcerated population. The filing 
rate slowly declined in the 1980s, but the increase in jail and prison 
population nonetheless pushed up raw filings. Then, as in the 1970s, 
the 1990s saw an increase in both jail and prison population and 
filings rates, until 1995.232 
The number of state-prisoner habeas petitions, likewise, rose significantly 
during the 1980s and early 1990s.233 In the mid-1990s, Congress responded 
to the increase in inmate filings in federal court by enacting two landmark 
bills—the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).234 
Inmate appeals from final judgments in civil cases are treated as “appeals 
as of right” governed by Appellate Rule 4.235 But a significant segment of 
such appeals—namely, those brought by prisoners seeking postconviction 
habeas or § 2255 relief—are in actuality appeals by permission.236 In Part 
II.B.1, I review the nature of the permission requirement in such appeals, and 
summarize the extent to which the Appellate Rules take account of that 
requirement. As Part II.B.1 recounts, this requirement of permission 
originated in state-prisoner cases, and was extended to federal prisoners by 
AEDPA.237 
AEDPA arose from concerns that the federal courts had exercised their 
habeas corpus jurisdiction in a way that interfered unduly with state criminal 
justice systems, and that (assertedly) a large proportion of state and federal 
                                                                                                                            
 232. Schlanger, Adulthood, supra note 4, at 156. 
 233. See supra notes 96 98 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 4, at 1578 (noting that proponents of the 
PLRA asserted “that inmate suits had skyrocketed and were deluging both courts and state and 
local governments”). 
 235. Appellate Rule 4 is titled “Appeal as of Right—When Taken.” FED. R. APP. P. 4. 
 236. See 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 35.4 (7th ed. 2017); Goodwin, supra note 3, at 795–96. 
 237. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 102, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–18. The summary that follows focuses on Title I of AEDPA, 
which addressed “Habeas Corpus Reform.” Other titles of the Act addressed victims’ rights, 
terrorism prohibitions, and other topics. 
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prisoners’ petitions for postconviction review were meritless.238 AEDPA sets 
a statute of limitations for state-prisoner habeas petitions239 and for federal-
prisoner proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.240 It requires screening by the 
courts of appeals for “second or successive” habeas or § 2255 proceedings, 
under a newly-heightened standard.241 It modifies the requirement that state 
prisoners exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas.242 It narrows 
the availability of federal habeas relief as to state-prisoner claims that have 
been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.”243 It revises the 
standard for federal-court deference to state-court factual findings.244 It 
diminishes the availability of federal evidentiary hearings for state 
prisoners.245 It bars the grant of federal habeas relief to state prisoners on the 
ground of “ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or 
State collateral post-conviction proceedings.”246 It creates a procedure that (in 
states that opt in and qualify) would “fast-track” habeas review for state 
prisoners who had been sentenced to death.247 And, as I discuss in Part II.B.1 
below, it revises and extends the requirement of court permission for habeas 
appeals.248 
The other significant piece of 1990s legislation is the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), which imposes constraints on inmate 
litigation outside of the habeas context. As one commentator recounted: “The 
PLRA sought to address two perceived evils: the burden on the federal court 
system created by the tremendous number of prisoner lawsuits, many of 
which were frivolous, and the micromanagement of prisons by liberal federal 
                                                                                                                            
 238. The Conference Committee Report explained: “This title incorporates reforms to curb 
the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute problems of unnecessary 
delay and abuse in capital cases.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 239. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2012). 
 240. Id. § 2255(f). 
 241. Id. § 2244(b) (setting procedure for state prisoners); id. § 2255(h) (providing that the 
§ 2244 procedure also applies to federal prisoners); see also 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 236, 
§ 3.2 (noting that “AEDPA altered both the procedures and standards for filing successive habeas 
corpus petitions”). 
 242. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012). 
 243. Id. § 2254(d). 
 244. Id. § 2254(e)(1). 
 245. Id. § 2254(e)(2). 
 246. Id. § 2254(i). 
 247. See id. §§ 2261–2266. 
 248. See discussion supra Part I.A, discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Appellate Rule 22. The 
Act also included some provisions concerning the appointment of counsel for state and federal 
prisoners on collateral review. See § 2254(h) (state prisoners); id. § 2255(g) (federal prisoners); 
see also 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 236, § 12.3 n.61 (stating that § 2254(h) codified prior 
practice concerning appointment of counsel for state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief). 
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district judges.”249 To address the latter issue, the PLRA sets a number of 
limits on institutional-reform lawsuits targeting prisons.250 To address the 
former issue, the PLRA mandates a number of strictures on prisoner suits.251 
It requires inmates challenging prison conditions to exhaust administrative 
grievance procedures.252 It provides for early trial-court screening of prison-
condition suits and requires dismissal if “the action is frivolous, malicious, 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary 
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”253 It limits the award 
of attorney fees for successful prisoner suits.254 It bars inmate lawsuits “for 
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing 
of physical injury”255 or (as later amended) a prior showing of a sexual act.256 
And, as I discuss in Part II.B.2, it imposes special constraints in inmate 
lawsuits in forma pauperis. 
1. Postconviction Review and Certificates of Appealability 
I noted in Part I.A.1 that, at the time of the adoption of the Appellate Rules, 
state prisoners were required to obtain a “certificate of probable cause” in 
order to appeal a judgment denying habeas relief; but no such requirement 
applied to appeals by federal prisoners seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.257 In AEDPA, Congress transmuted the “certificate of probable 
                                                                                                                            
 249. Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1853 (2002). 
 250. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (2012) (setting limits on injunctive relief in “any civil 
action with respect to prison conditions”); id. § 3626(b) (providing for presumptive termination 
of such injunctive relief absent specified conditions). The limit on attorney fees, discussed in note 
254 infra and accompanying text, also seems designed to affect institutional-reform litigation. 
 251. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (2012) (defining “prisoner”). The PLRA also provides for 
remote electronic participation of inmates in hearings affecting their cases. See id. § 1997e(f). 
 252. See id. § 1997e(a). 
 253. Id. § 1997e(c)(1). The PLRA also authorizes the defendant to hold off on responding to 
an inmate complaint unless and until the court requires a reply based on the court’s finding “that 
the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits.” Id. § 1997e(g). 
 254. See id. § 1997e(d). 
 255. See id. § 1997e(e). 
 256. This change was made as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 2013. See Pub. L. 
No. 113-4, § 1101, 127 Stat. 54, 134 (2013). 
 257. As of 1968—and until 1996—the relevant portion of 28 U.S.C. § 2253 stated: “An 
appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding 
where the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, unless the justice 
or judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause.” 
28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1994) (later amended in 1996). 
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cause” requirement into a requirement for a “certificate of appealability” 
(“COA”), and extended the COA requirement to § 2255 petitioners.258 
Both of these changes appear to have been motivated by a dim view 
concerning the merit of habeas and § 2255 filings. A House Judiciary 
Committee Report explained the extension of the certificate requirement to 
§ 2255 appeals thus: “Since federal prisoners, like state prisoners, generate a 
high volume of meritless applications for collateral relief, it is appropriate to 
require that appeals of habeas corpus petitions meet a threshold probable 
cause standard before such an appeal will be heard by an appellate panel.”259 
The House Judiciary Committee Report also indicated an intent to codify 
the Supreme Court’s 1983 interpretation of the prior probable-cause test, but 
to require that test’s application issue by issue:  
The bill also strengthens the certificate of probable cause 
requirement by providing . . . that a certificate may issue only on a 
substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. The bill thus 
enacts the standard of Barefoot v. Estelle . . . (1983). The bill also 
requires that the certificate indicate which specific issue or issues 
satisfy this standard.260  
The Supreme Court has confirmed that AEDPA “codified [the] standard, 
announced in Barefoot v. Estelle . . . , for determining what constitutes the 
requisite showing.”261 
Another potential narrowing (compared to prior law) concerns the type of 
right which, if potentially denied, can be the basis for appeal. “Supplanting 
the prior ‘probable cause’ regime, AEDPA purported to adopt, but instead 
altered, a key component of the previous standard, replacing the word 
‘federal’ with the word ‘constitutional.’”262 Some lower courts have taken the 
statute’s reference to “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
right”263 to exclude the possibility of COAs for denials of federal statutory or 
                                                                                                                            
 258. AEDPA also made conforming amendments to Appellate Rule 22. See Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 103, 110 Stat. 1214, 
1218. 
 259. H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995) (accompanied H.R. 729, 104th Cong. (1995)). 
 260. Id.  
 261. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). 
 262. Goodwin, supra note 3, at 796. 
 263. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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treaty rights.264 Though that interpretation may not be free from doubt,265 
support for it might be found in the Supreme Court’s “due note for the 
[statute’s] substitution of the word ‘constitutional’” for the prior certificate-
of-probable-cause standard’s “federal.”266 
The COA requirement sets a high hurdle for habeas and § 2255 petitioners 
who seek appellate review. Professor Nancy King, based on a study of 
appeals in “approximately 6.5 percent of the non-capital habeas cases 
commenced in federal district courts in 2003 and 2004 by state prisoners,” 
reports that “[m]ore than 92 percent of all COA rulings were denials.”267 
2. The PLRA’s Constraints on Inmate Appeals 
I noted in Part I.A.1 the earlier debate concerning the incentives of 
indigent litigants. Congress, long before, had required something in the way 
of screening in order to offset a concern that one who was not required to 
front the costs of his appeal might bring the appeal regardless of its merit.268 
In the 1960s, however, the Court had directed lower courts not to apply that 
screening too rigorously, lest they deprive indigent appellants of equal access 
to justice.269 In the PLRA, Congress took a very different view, imposing on 
indigent prisoners270 additional strictures, most of which do not apply to other 
indigent litigants.271 
                                                                                                                            
 264. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 145 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 265. The leading treatise states:  
The as yet unresolved question is whether section 2253(c) permits the issuance 
of a certificate of appealability on a claim of a violation of a federal statute or 
federal treaty as did the pre-AEDPA standard for certificates of probable cause 
to appeal. The lower federal courts are divided on this issue. 
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 236, § 35.4. 
 266. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). 
 267. King, supra note 4, at 308 (footnote omitted). 
 268. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 270. The statute defines prisoner to mean “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility 
who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 
criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary 
program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) (2012). 
 271. Section 1915(e)(2) is drafted in terms that do not appear to be limited to inmate litigants. 
For a case applying § 1915(e)(2) to a non-prisoner case, see, for example, Newsome v. EEOC, 
301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). See also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(en banc) (“[A]lthough the PLRA was intended to cut down on the volume of prisoner 
lawsuits, . . . section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by 
prisoners.”). 
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Those strictures require closer examination of both the inmate’s resources 
and the merits of the inmate’s contentions. In addition to the financial 
disclosures required of other in forma pauperis applicants, the PLRA requires 
inmates to “submit a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or 
institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately 
preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal, obtained from the 
appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner is or was 
confined.”272 While other in forma pauperis litigants are still authorized to 
proceed “without prepayment of fees,”273 the PLRA directs the court to 
collect the filing fee for a prisoner’s civil action or appeal via instalments—
an initial withdrawal of (roughly speaking) one-fifth of the average contents 
of or average monthly deposits to the inmate’s institutional account,274 
followed by periodic monthly payments of one-fifth of the prior month’s 
deposits to the account.275 
The PLRA’s financial provisions affect both inmate litigants and the 
institutions that house them. Although the PLRA specifies that the payment 
requirement will not bar the progress of an inmate’s action or appeal for lack 
of funds,276 the effect on an inmate’s institutional account can be significant, 
especially because this requirement has been interpreted to entail the stacking 
of simultaneous withdrawals for multiple actions and appeals.277 And, from 
                                                                                                                            
 272. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). 
 273. Id. § 1915(a)(1). 
 274. Section 1915(b)(1) provides: 
Notwithstanding [§ 1915(a)], if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an 
appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount 
of a filing fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial 
payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 
percent of the greater of— 
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account; or 
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month 
period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal. 
Id. § 1915(b)(1). 
 275. See id. § 1915(b)(2) (“After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be 
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to 
the prisoner’s account.”). Section 1915(f) sets a similar mechanism for withdrawing from the 
prisoner’s institutional account amounts to pay any costs imposed on the prisoner at the end of a 
lawsuit. 
 276. See id. § 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil 
action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and 
no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”). 
 277. See Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016) (“It is undisputed that the initial partial 
filing fee is to be assessed on a per-case basis, i.e., each time the prisoner files a lawsuit. . . . We 
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the institution’s perspective, the PLRA requires an investment of employee 
time to process the institutional account statements for each inmate litigant.278 
The PLRA also sets new requirements concerning the screening of 
prisoners’ lawsuits and appeals and imposes a “three-strikes” provision on 
inmates who file in forma pauperis actions or appeals. In a provision that 
appears to apply to inmates and non-inmates alike,279 the PLRA directs that  
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines 
that—(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or 
appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on 
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a 
defendant who is immune from such relief.280  
The PLRA imposes a screening requirement concerning all prisoner suits 
(regardless of whether they are brought in forma pauperis);281 that provision 
directs the district court to promptly screen prisoner suits against government 
defendants and “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any 
portion of the complaint, if the complaint—(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief 
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”282 The PLRA’s three-
                                                                                                                            
hold that monthly installment payments, like the initial partial payment, are to be assessed on a 
per-case basis.”). 
 278. See ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF FALL 2012 MEETING OF 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 15 (2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/appellate-minutes-09-2012.pdf (“A district 
judge member reported that . . . within his district, each prison has a designated person whose job 
it is to process the institutional-account statements.”). 
 279. See supra note 271. 
 280. This directive applies “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may 
have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2012). 
 281. See, e.g., Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (“The language 
of the statute does not distinguish between prisoners who proceed in forma pauperis and prisoners 
who pay the requisite filing fee.”). 
 282. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (2012). 
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strikes provision applies to prisoner litigants proceeding in forma pauperis; it 
provides: 
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment 
in a civil action or proceeding under [§ 1915] if the prisoner has, on 
3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States 
that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the 
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.283 
The PLRA’s effect on inmate civil rights cases appears to have been 
dramatic. Professor Schlanger reports that “[a]fter a very steep decline in both 
filings and filing rates in 1996 and 1997, rates continued to shrink for another 
decade (although the increasing incarcerated population meant that the 
resulting number of filings increased a bit). Since 2007, filing rates, prison 
population, and filings have all plateaued.”284 
 
* * * 
 
Part I noted that the era that produced the original Appellate Rules was 
one in which all three branches of the federal government took steps to ensure 
equal access to the courts for indigent litigants, including inmates. The 
changes enacted by Congress in the mid-1990s were intended to and did alter 
that approach. In AEDPA, Congress somewhat tightened what it now termed 
the certificate of appealability requirement, and extended that requirement to 
federal prisoners seeking § 2255 relief. Post-AEDPA, no appeal in a 
postconviction review proceeding can be seen, strictly speaking, purely as an 
appeal as of right: rather, the inmate must seek permission to appeal by 
making “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” The 
PLRA, likewise, reduced the extent to which inmate appeals in non-habeas 
civil cases could be viewed as appeals as of right. Not only do the PLRA’s 
periodic payment requirements deliberately impose a financial bite on what 
may be a meager prison account, but the PLRA’s screening requirement 
directs the court of appeals to proactively screen in forma pauperis appeals 
for lack of merit. And for prisoners who have incurred three “strikes,” the 
PLRA goes even further, actually barring appeals unless the prisoner faces 
“imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 
It is clear that, now, a picture of the process for inmate appeals must 
encompass more than solely the Appellate Rules. It must take account of local 
                                                                                                                            
 283. Id. § 1915(g). 
 284. Schlanger, Adulthood, supra note 4, at 156. 
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circuit case management practices and also of statutory constraints set by 
AEDPA and the PLRA. But a full account of the procedures for inmate 
appeals should also consider the impact of changing technology. In the next 
section, I turn to that topic. 
III. TECHNOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 
I argued in Part I that, where inmate appeals were concerned, much of the 
“action” in the early years of the Appellate Rules occurred largely in a 
dialogue between the Supreme Court and the rulemakers—each of which 
instituted procedural innovations that helped to ensure that inmate litigants’ 
access to the appellate process approximated, insofar as possible, that of non-
incarcerated litigants. Part II noted the increasing importance of local circuit 
case management practices and recounted Congress’s determination, in the 
mid-1990s, that the system was burdened by undue amounts of inmate access 
to both trial-court and appellate process. AEDPA and the PLRA, I observed, 
significantly constrained that access. In the past two decades, the courts have 
expended considerable effort working out the details of these two statutory 
schemes, and the rulemakers adopted modest changes both to adjust the 
Appellate Rules to the statutes285 and to clarify the operation of the prison 
mailbox rule.286 
                                                                                                                            
 285. In 1998, Rule 22(b) was amended to recognize the extension of the COA requirement 
to § 2255 appeals and to clarify that “both district and circuit judges, as well as the circuit justice, 
may issue a certificate of appealability.” FED. R. APP. P. 22(b) advisory committee’s note to 1998 
amendment. In 2009, Rule 22 was amended to conform to revisions to the habeas and § 2255 
rules. Rule 11 of those rules, as amended, requires that the district court “issue or deny a certificate 
of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” U.S. DIST. CT. R. § 2255 
CASES 11; see also U.S. DIST. CT. R. § 2254 CASES 11. A 2002 amendment added the phrase 
“unless a statute provides otherwise” to Rule 24(a)(2)’s provision that “[i]f the district court grants 
the motion [to appeal in forma pauperis], the party may proceed on appeal without prepaying or 
giving security for fees and costs.” FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(2). This change reflected the PLRA’s 
requirement “that prisoners who bring civil actions or appeals from civil actions must ‘pay the 
full amount of a filing fee,’” as well as the PLRA’s mandate that “[p]risoners who are unable to 
pay the full amount of the filing fee at the time that their actions or appeals are filed are generally 
required to pay part of the fee and then to pay the remainder of the fee in installments.” Id. 
advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment. The 2002 amendments added a similar caveat 
(“unless . . . a statute provides otherwise”) to Rule 24(a)(3)’s presumption that one who was 
permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in the district court may continue in forma pauperis on 
appeal. The Committee Note explained: “The PLRA . . . provides that a prisoner who was 
permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in the district court and who wishes to continue to proceed 
in forma pauperis on appeal may not do so ‘automatically,’ but must seek permission.” Id. 24(a)(3) 
advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment. 
 286. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(c) advisory committee’s note to 2016 amendment; id. 25(a)(2)(C) 
advisory committee’s note to 2016 amendment. 
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But I will suggest in Part III that in the future, one of the most significant 
drivers of change in the procedure for inmate appeals may be the availability 
of technology within prisons and other institutions. Parts III.A and III.B note 
that technological advances have spurred significant changes in how counsel 
prepare and file appellate papers, and recount rule amendments designed to 
accommodate those changes. New length limits depend on word count, and 
new filing provisions set electronic filing as the default requirement. Part 
III.C observes that, throughout this period of change, the rulemakers have 
been alert to the fact that such technological advances are the exception rather 
than the rule for inmate litigants. The result, for the moment, is a procedural 
framework that explicitly operates on two tracks—one for represented 
litigants, and another for pro se (frequently incarcerated) litigants. In Part 
III.C, I highlight examples of institutions that are making technology 
available to inmate litigants, and I suggest that, in the coming years, the 
nature of the federal appellate process for incarcerated pro se litigants will 
depend to a great extent on collaboration between individual courts and 
particular prisons and jails. Part III.D closes by examining how the current 
rules, and pending amendments to them, take account of these developments. 
A. Word Processing and the Overhaul of Length Limits 
The Appellate Rules—created initially in the age of typewriters—have 
evolved to take account of the computer era. During that evolution, the 
rulemakers have consistently been conscious of the fact that inmate litigants 
have little or no access to technologies widely used by lawyers. The rules’ 
provisions for the length limits of briefs and other documents illustrate this 
evolution. 
The original Appellate Rules set length limits only for briefs and rehearing 
petitions,287 and the limits differed depending on whether the documents in 
question were printed or typewritten. Principal briefs were not to “not exceed 
50 pages of standard typographic printing or 70 pages of printing by any other 
process of duplicating or copying”; the limits for reply briefs were one-half 
those for principal briefs.288 A Committee Note explained that these numbers 
reflected the assumption that “[f]ifty pages of standard typographic printing 
is the approximate equivalent of 70 pages of typewritten text.”289 Rehearing 
petitions were, presumptively, not to “exceed 10 pages of standard 
                                                                                                                            
 287. See id. 28(g) (1967); id. 40(b) (1967) (last amended in 2016). Original Rule 28(g) was 
abrogated in 1998. See 1998 Committee Note to Rule 28(g). 
 288. Id. 28(g) (1967) (abrogated 1998). 
 289. Id. 28 advisory committee’s note to 1967 adoption. 
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typographic printing or 15 pages of printing by any other process of 
duplicating or copying.”290 
Amendments in 1979 removed the distinction between typewritten and 
printed documents for purposes of length limits. For briefs in either format, 
the limits were presumptively fifty pages (for principal brief) and twenty-five 
pages (for the reply).291 The Committee Note explained that the distinction 
between the two formats was being eliminated because 
“investigation . . . [had] disclosed that the number of words on the printed 
page is little if any larger than the number on a page typed in standard elite 
type.”292 In amending Rule 40(b)’s length limit for rehearing petitions, the 
Committee chose to make the longer (15-page) limit uniformly applicable 
regardless of format.293 
In the ensuing two decades, of course, word processing became widely 
available, and this led the rulemakers to become concerned that brief writers 
were exploiting the page limits by creatively using word processing features 
to get more words on each page.294 Accordingly, in 1998, the length limits for 
briefs were overhauled. The new approach used a two-tier system: it set type-
volume limits (expressed in terms of word or line quantities) for briefs, but 
as an alternative it set a “safe harbor” page limit. Brief-writers who complied 
with that (now shortened) page limit need not count words or lines. The 
option of counting lines was designed to make the type-volume limits usable 
for those preparing type-written briefs.295 
Notably, though, the new type-volume system was applied only to the 
length limits for briefs; other length limits were typically expressed in pages. 
In 1998, the rules were amended to add page limits for motion papers296 and 
rehearing en banc petitions.297 In 2002, the rules were amended to add page 
limits for papers filed in connection with requests for permission to appeal298 
and for papers in connection with extraordinary writ proceedings.299 It 
appears that the rulemakers used page, rather than type-volume limits for 
                                                                                                                            
 290. Id. 40(b) (1967) (last amended in 2016). 
 291. See id. 28(g) (1979) (abrogated 1998). 
 292. Id. advisory committee’s note to 1979 amendment. 
 293. See id. 40(b) advisory committee’s note to 1979 amendment. 
 294. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 7 (1997), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST9-1997.pdf. 
 295. See FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment. 
 296. See id. 27(d)(2) (as amended in 1998). 
 297. See id. 35(b)(2) (as amended in 1998). 
 298. See id. 5(c) (as amended in 2002). 
 299. See id. 21(d) (2002) (last amended in 2016). 
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these other types of filings because they did not perceive the same risk of 
manipulation that had occasioned the use of type-volume limits for briefs.300 
In 2016, the Appellate Rules’ length limits were comprehensively 
overhauled,301 in ways that differentiate between litigants who use computers 
and those who do not. Rules 5, 21, 27, 35, and 40—which previously set page 
limits—were amended to impose type-volume limits for documents 
“produced using a computer.” For “handwritten or typewritten” documents, 
the prior page limits in those rules continued unchanged. The introduction of 
the distinction between computer-produced and other documents was 
designed to protect pro se filers who lacked access to a computer: if the 
rulemakers had instead adopted the type-volume-limit-plus-safe-harbor 
approach that applies to briefs, it would have been necessary to shorten the 
relevant page limits.302 
The design of the length limits in the Appellate Rules, then, reflects the 
rulemakers’ awareness of the special circumstances of pro se litigants, 
including inmates. Those circumstances also play a prominent role in the 
Rules Committees’ ongoing discussions concerning the treatment of 
electronic filing and service. 
B. Electronic Filing and Service 
The Appellate Rules, and the other national rules, are in the midst of an 
evolution to account for electronic filing and service. Pending amendments 
would set a nationwide presumption that represented litigants must file 
electronically. But pro se litigants, by contrast, could file electronically only 
with court permission (through order or local rule). 
Currently, the rules largely defer to local circuit practices concerning 
electronic filing. Appellate Rule 25(a)(2)(D) authorizes each circuit to adopt 
a local rule permitting or requiring electronic filing, so long as any electronic 
filing requirement includes reasonable exceptions.303 Rule 25(c)(1) permits 
                                                                                                                            
 300. See id. 35(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment. 
 301. The 2016 changes’ most prominently discussed feature does not affect non-computer 
users; the amendments to Rules 28.1 and 32 shortened the word limits for briefs so as to reflect 
the pre-1998 page limits multiplied by 260 words per page. The line limits for briefs, however, 
did not change. 
 302. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, MEETING OF JANUARY 9–10, 2014, 
at 6 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/committee-rules-
practice-and-procedure-january-2014. 
 303. See FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(2)(D) (“A court of appeals may by local rule permit or require 
papers to be filed, signed, or verified by electronic means that are consistent with technical 
standards, if any, that the Judicial Conference of the United States establishes. A local rule may 
require filing by electronic means only if reasonable exceptions are allowed.”). Rule 25(a)(2)(D) 
also defines an electronically filed paper as a “written paper” for purposes of the Appellate Rules. 
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electronic service “if the party being served consents in writing” (such 
consent is ordinarily required as a condition of registration in the federal 
courts’ Case Management / Electronic Case Filing system, or CM/ECF). Rule 
25(c)(2) permits parties to use the court’s transmission equipment to make 
electronic service if authorized by local rule. Rule 25(c)(3) directs parties to 
serve other parties in “a manner at least as expeditious as the manner used to 
file the paper with the court,” when “reasonable” in light of relevant factors. 
Rule 25(c)(4) provides that “[s]ervice by electronic means is complete on 
transmission, unless the party making service is notified that the paper was 
not received by the party served.” For purposes of computing time periods 
that run from the date of service, Rule 26(c) permits the addition of three 
extra days when the paper is not delivered on the date of service; so, for 
example, when service is by physical mail the recipient gets an extra three 
days for its response. Prior to 2016, electronic service was included among 
the types of service that triggered this “three-day rule”; in 2016, the rules 
were amended to eliminate the extra three days when a paper is served 
electronically. 
As noted, Appellate Rule 25 leaves the treatment of electronic filing 
largely to local circuit rules. Currently, all thirteen circuits presumptively 
require that all attorneys file electronically,304 though most circuits have 
provisions permitting attorneys to seek an exemption from this 
requirement.305 The circuits vary somewhat in their treatment of electronic 
filing by pro se litigants, especially with respect to inmate filers.306 Some 
circuits do not allow pro se litigants to use the CM/ECF system.307 Some 
                                                                                                                            
 304. See 1ST CIR. R. 25(a) (“Use of the electronic filing system is mandatory for all attorneys 
filing in this court, unless they are granted an exemption, and is voluntary for all non-incarcerated 
pro se litigants proceeding without counsel.”); 2D CIR. R. 25.1(b)(1)–(2); 3D CIR. R. 25.1(a); 4TH 
CIR. R. 25(a)(1); 5TH CIR. R. 25.2.1; 6TH CIR. R. 25(a)(1); 7TH CIR. R. 25(a); 8TH CIR. R. 25A(a); 
9TH CIR. R. 25-5(a); 10TH CIR. R. 25.3; 11TH CIR. R. 25-3(a); D.C. CIR. R. 25(a), (b)(1); FED. CIR. 
R. 25(a)(1).  
 305. See 1ST CIR. R. 25(a); 2D CIR. R. 25.1(j)(1) (requiring “a showing of extreme hardship 
or exceptional circumstances”); 4TH CIR. R. 25(a)(1); 5TH CIR. R. 25.2.1; 6TH CIR. R.25(a)(1); 
7TH CIR. R. 25(c); 8TH CIR. R. 25A(a); 9TH CIR. R. 25-5(a); 10TH CIR. R. 25.3; 11TH CIR. R. 25-
3(b); D.C. CIR. R. 25(c)(2); FED. CIR. R. 25(c)(1)(I). The Third Circuit does not appear to have a 
provision concerning attorney requests for exemptions. 
 306. The summary that follows omits a number of details for the sake of brevity. For example, 
circuit rules often have different requirements for the mode of filing specified documents, such 
as those that initiate a matter in the court of appeals. 
 307. See 6TH CIR. R. 25(b)(2)(A) (“The following must be filed in paper format: . . . A 
document filed by a party not represented by counsel.”); 7TH CIR. R. 25(b) (requiring that 
“documents submitted by unrepresented litigants who are not themselves lawyers” be filed in 
paper form); FED. CIR. R. 25(a)(1) (“Pro se parties must submit any documents in paper 
form . . . .”); see also 11TH CIR. R. 25-3(a) (“Pro se litigants and attorneys who are exempt from 
 
50:0247] FEDERAL RULES OF INMATE APPEALS 305 
 
circuits permit (but do not require) pro se litigants to use CM/ECF,308 while 
in other circuits, pro se litigants can use CM/ECF if they obtain court 
permission;309 of these circuits, some distinguish between pro se inmate 
litigants and other pro se litigants.310 In the Eighth Circuit, when a pro se 
litigant files in paper format, the Clerk’s Office will scan an electronic copy 
of the filing and place it into CM/ECF—which removes the need for the pro 
se litigant to serve paper copies of the document on other parties (unless those 
other parties are not on CM/ECF themselves).311 
In recent years, the Standing Committee’s CM/ECF Subcommittee—i.e., 
a subcommittee of the parent rulemaking committee—set out to consider 
possible amendments to all five sets of national rules that would take account 
of technological progress. The alteration in the “three-day rule”—noted 
above—was one of the initial products of that consideration. More recently, 
the Committees have been considering possible amendments that—subject to 
certain exceptions—would make electronic filing a nationwide requirement 
and authorize electronic service irrespective of party consent. The specific 
needs of pro se prisoner cases have figured prominently in the Committees’ 
discussions of this topic. 
A proposal that the national rules be amended to presumptively require 
electronic filing for all litigants, even pro se litigants, met with controversy. 
Participants from the Criminal Rules Committee, in particular, expressed 
concern that such an approach would not be appropriate for the criminal or 
habeas rules. In the spring of 2015, the Criminal Rules Committee’s reporters 
articulated three sets of concerns.312 First, they enumerated several challenges 
                                                                                                                            
electronic filing must be served by the filing party through the conventional means of service set 
forth in FRAP 25.”). 
 308. See 1ST CIR. R. 25(a); 3D CIR. R. 25.1(c); 8TH CIR. R. 25A(a); 9TH CIR. R. 25-5(a). 
 309. See 2D CIR. R. 25.1(b)(3) (“A pro se party who wishes to file electronically must seek 
permission from the court . . . .”); 4TH CIR. R. 25(a)(1) (“Pro se litigants are not required to file 
documents electronically but may be authorized to file electronically in a pending case . . . .”); 
5TH CIR. R. 25.2.1; D.C. CIR. R. 25(c)(1) (“A party proceeding pro se must file documents in paper 
form with the clerk and must be served with documents in paper form unless the pro se party has 
been permitted to register as an ECF filer.”); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, 
CM/ECF USER’S MANUAL § II.A.2, at 4 (7th ed. 2017), 
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/clerk/2017%20CMECF%20NextGen%20User
%27s%20Manual.pdf.  
 310. See 1ST CIR. R. 25(a) (permitting “non-incarcerated pro se litigants” to use electronic 
filing if they so choose); 5TH CIR. R. 25.2.1 (“Non-incarcerated pro se litigants may request the 
clerk’s permission to register as a Filing User, in civil cases only, under such conditions as the 
clerk may authorize.”). 
 311. See 8TH CIR. R. 25B. 
 312. Memorandum from Sara Beale & Nancy King, Reporters, Criminal Rules Comm., to 
the Civil Rules Comm. 1–2 (Mar. 26, 2015), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, SUPPLEMENT 
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for which the CM/ECF system was not, they warned, yet ready. The CM/ECF 
system, they observed, had been “designed for use by attorneys, who are 
bound by rules of professional conduct and who have received a legal 
education.”313 The concerns, they argued, are particularly acute in criminal 
and habeas or § 2255 cases. For example, inmates likely lack the ability “to 
file electronically or receive electronic confirmations. . . . Even if some do 
have email access at one time, they often move from facility to facility, and 
in and out of custody.”314 And how would inmates “file case-initiating 
documents without credit card information”?315 Second, requiring criminal 
defendants to show good cause in order to receive an exemption from 
electronic filing would run counter to “the constitutional obligation to provide 
court access to prisoners and those accused of crime.”316 Third, permitting 
courts to opt out by local rule would force most districts to adopt new local 
rules.317 A representative for the Department of Justice voiced similar 
concerns:  
[T]he CM/ECF system is just not ready to handle all of the types of 
cases the Department sees, especially the Section 2255 
cases. . . . [A]lthough many [inmates] have access to email, none 
have access to the internet. And there are tens of thousands of 
prisoners who are being held by the Marshal’s Service, mostly in 
county jails, not federal facilities, with no computer access.318 
In August 2016, the Appellate Rules Committee published for comment a 
proposed amendment to Appellate Rule 25 that would distinguish—for 
purposes of electronic filing—between represented litigants and pro se 
litigants. It would require represented litigants to “file electronically, unless 
nonelectronic filing is allowed by the court for good cause or is allowed or 
required by local rule.”319 Pro se litigants, by contrast, could “file 
electronically only if allowed by court order or by local rule”; a court could 
                                                                                                                            
TO THE AGENDA BOOK 11, 11–12 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/cv2015-04-
supplement_0.pdf. 
 313. Id. at 12. 
 314. Id. at 13. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id.  
 317. See id. at 13–14. 
 318. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MINUTES MAR. 16–17 18 (2015) [hereinafter 
MARCH 2015 MINUTES], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-min-2015-03.pdf. 
 319. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
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require pro se litigants to file electronically by court order, “or by a local rule 
that includes reasonable exceptions.”320 Some public comments criticized this 
approach: those “comments argued that unrepresented parties generally 
should have the right to file electronically, which is much less expensive than 
filing non-electronically.”321 The Appellate Rules Committee considered 
those concerns but concluded that they were outweighed by “concern[s] 
about possible difficulties that unrepresented parties might have in using 
electronic filing and about the difficulty of holding them accountable for 
abusing the filing system.”322 
In October 2017, a package of proposed rule amendments—including the 
proposed amendments to Appellate Rule 25 and proposed e-filing 
amendments to the Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Rules—was forwarded 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.323 The Bankruptcy, Civil, and Appellate proposals 
each contain similar provisions permitting pro se litigants to e-file only with 
court permission (by order or local rule) and permitting courts to require e-
filing by pro se litigants only by order or via a local rule with “reasonable 
exceptions.”324 The Civil Rules Committee’s report explained that these 
features in the e-filing proposals were designed “to support programs in a few 
courts that have set up systems for pro se filing by prisoners.”325 The Criminal 
Rules proposal—like the other proposals—permits pro se litigants to e-file 
only by court permission; but it omits the provision authorizing courts to 
                                                                                                                            
 320. Id. at 275. 
 321. Memorandum from Michael A. Chagares, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, 
to David G. Campbell, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 17 (May 22, 2017), in 
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, AGENDA BOOK 79, 95 (2017) [hereinafter JUNE 
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 322. Id. 
 323. See Memorandum from Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Chief Counsel, Rules Comm., to Scott 
S. Harris, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court 1 (Oct. 4, 2017), in Transmittal of Proposed Amendments 
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 324. Memorandum from David A. Campbell, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & 
Procedure, to Scott S. Harris, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court 2–3 (Oct. 4, 2017), in 2017 Proposed 
Amendments Package, supra note 323.  
 325. Memorandum from John D. Bates, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to David G. 
Campbell, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 18, 2017), in JUNE 2017 
AGENDA BOOK, supra note 321, at 415, 417. 
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require e-filing by pro se litigants.326 The accompanying Committee Note 
explains:  
A different approach to electronic filing by unrepresented parties is 
needed in criminal cases, where electronic filing by pro se prisoners 
presents significant challenges. Pro se parties filing papers under 
the criminal rules generally lack the means to e-file or receive 
electronic confirmations, yet must be provided access to the courts 
under the Constitution.327 
If the Supreme Court approves the proposed amendments, they will be on 
track to take effect (absent contrary action by Congress) on December 1, 
2018. 
C. Local and Institutional Practices as the Driver of Change 
How will the new national electronic filing rules fit with practice in 
correctional institutions across the country? To assess that question, I first 
sketch here a partial snapshot of that practice as it currently stands. The 
snapshot is only partial because this area of practice is challenging to 
research. And it is a snapshot that, quite likely, will change even during the 
time between this article’s drafting and its publication. But, for the sake of 
discussion, I provide an overview of partnerships between state correctional 
institutions and seventeen federal district courts, as well as a description of a 
new pilot program that partners selected federal courts with federal Bureau 
of Prisons facilities. I focus here largely on district courts, not courts of 
appeals, because the district courts tend to be the initial locus of 
experimentation. 
At least seventeen out of the ninety-four federal districts currently have 
electronic-filing initiatives for prisoners in state correctional institutions.328 
                                                                                                                            
 326. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 49(b)(3) (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., Proposed 
Amendments 2017), in JUNE 2017 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 321, at 665, 670. 
 327. FED. R. CRIM. P. 49(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 2017 proposed amendment, in 
JUNE 2017 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 321, at 665, 667.  
 328. See generally In re Pilot Project for the Submission of Certain Prisoner Filings Through 
Elec. Mail, No. 17-04 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017), 
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/general-orders/GO%2017-04.pdf; Standing 
Order on Prisoner Elec. Filing Program, No. CTAO-16-21 (D. Conn. June 22, 2016), 
http://www.ctd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/general-ordes/16-
21_%20%28EXT%29Standing%20Order%20On%20Prisoner%20Electronic%20Filing%20Pro
gram.pdf; In re Prisoner Elec. Filing Initiative, No. 16-35-1 (E.D. Wash. May 26, 2016), 
http://www.waed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/general-ordes/16-35-1.pdf; In re Procedural 
Rules for Elec. Submission of Prisoner Litig. Filed by Plaintiffs Incarcerated at Participating Penal 
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None of these initiatives is memorialized in a local rule; rather, they tend to 
be set out in a general order or standing order or in a manual of procedures. 
A number of the initiatives are not even district-wide; rather, they are limited 
(especially at first) to selected correctional institutions within the district. 
None of the programs extends to criminal cases; some cover all types of civil 
cases, some target habeas and civil rights cases, and some are limited to 
§ 1983 cases. 
With one exception, these programs do not permit the inmates themselves 
to file electronically. Rather, the inmate gives the filing to prison staff, who 
scan the document and email it to the court; court staff then file the document 
electronically in the CM/ECF system. (The exception is the District of Kansas 
procedure, which appears to contemplate that the inmate himself will scan 
and email the filing to the court.329) 
                                                                                                                            
Insts., Standing Order No. 3-1-16 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/assets/File/Standing%20Order%203-1-16.pdf; In re 
Procedural Rules for Elec. Filing Program, No. 15-05 (C.D. Ill., S.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/sites/ilcd/files/general-ordes/General%20Order%2015-
05%20redacted.pdf; In re Procedural Rules for Prisoner E-Filing Pilot Project, No. 300 (D. Idaho 
Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.id.uscourts.gov/Content_Fetcher/index.cfml/Procedural_Rules_
for_Prisoner_E-Filing_2271.pdf?Content_ID=2271; In re The Prison Elec. Filing Pilot Project, 
No. 15-35-1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.waed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/general-ordes/15-35-1.pdf; In re Elec. 
Submission of Prisoner § 1983 Documents, No. 2012-01 (D. Nev. Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/Files/2012-
01%202nd%20Amend%20General%20Order%20with%20Addendum.pdf; In re Prisoner Elec. 
Filing Program (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2014), http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/sites/insd/files/general-
ordes/PrisonerE-FilingOrder-Signed.6.26.14_5.pdf; In re Prisoner Elec. Filing Program, No. 
2014-3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.innd.uscourts.gov/sites/innd/files/2014-3.pdf; 
Procedures for the Prisoner Elec. Filing Program (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://www.mow.uscourts.gov/sites/mow/files/WDMOStandingOrderE-Filing.pdf; In re 
Procedural Rules for Prisoner Elec. Filing Pilot Project, No. 2012-01 (M.D. La., W.D. La., E.D. 
La. Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.lamd.uscourts.gov:8080/calendars/general_
orders.nsf/05c593850e73d5f686256bb4007a513d/27f102fea8a6ded58625798200527894/$FILE
/2012-01.pdf; U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. & W. DISTS. OF WIS., PRISONER E-FILING PROGRAM 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL (2017), 
http://www.wiwd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Admin_Order_334.pdf; U.S. DIST. COURT FOR 
THE DIST. OF KAN., CIVIL CASES: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR FILING, SIGNING, AND 
VERIFYING PLEADINGS AND PAPERS BY ELECTRONIC MEANS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS § I.B (rev. ed. 2016) [hereinafter KANSAS ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE], http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/local_rules/local_rules_
mobile.pdf. 
 329. See KANSAS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 328, § I.B.1–.2 (“1. Prisoner 
litigants will scan pleadings in civil actions on a digital sender or similar equipment. 2. Once the 
document has been scanned, the prisoner will e-mail the pleading to the court at: 
ksd_clerks_topeka@ksd.uscourts.gov.”). 
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None of the programs provides for electronic delivery of notices or 
documents to the inmate himself. In some programs, prison staff receive the 
“notice of electronic filing” (“NEF”) and print and deliver it to the inmate. 
Some of these programs also provide that the staff will print the underlying 
documents and deliver them to the inmate; some contemplate printing the 
underlying documents only for court orders. In programs that do not provide 
for staff printing of documents filed in the case, the program contemplates 
that the inmate will instead receive hard copies of those documents by mail. 
(A common pattern is for correctional staff to print court orders for the 
inmate, but for third parties to serve their documents as hard copies by mail.) 
A few programs explicitly address what happens if the inmate is 
transferred out of a participating facility. The District of Idaho’s procedures 
address the application of the prison-mailbox rule: “Where applicable, the 
‘mailbox rule’ filing date will be the date the prisoner places the document 
into the hands of prison officials for e-filing.”330 
Though descriptions of the particulars do not yet appear to be available, a 
recently-commenced pilot project will test a similar program in federal 
Bureau of Prisons facilities. A September 2016 news release describing the 
project’s approval by the U.S. Judicial Conference explains: 
The one year joint pilot with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) will 
provide pro se prisoners access to a digital kiosk in BOP facilities 
in order to file civil cases in the district and appellate courts 
participating in the pilot. The system will provide a one-way means 
for transmitting documents from the prisoner to the court, which 
would docket the filing in its Case Management/Electronic Case 
Files system. It is anticipated that up to 25 courts will participate in 
the pilot.331 
The kiosks’ scanners “will accommodate typed or hand-written 
documents”332 and will transmit those documents “to a district court’s 
                                                                                                                            
 330. In re Procedural Rules for Prisoner E-Filing Pilot Project, No. 300, at 2 (D. Idaho Sept. 
18, 2015), https://www.id.uscourts.gov/Content_Fetcher/index.cfml/Procedural_Rules_
for_Prisoner_E-Filing_2271.pdf?Content_ID=2271. Somewhat similarly, the District of 
Connecticut’s order provides: “Correctional staff will date-stamp each prisoner filing upon 
receipt, prior to scanning, signifying that the document was scanned for filing with the Clerk at a 
specific date and time. Documents shall be deemed filed with the Clerk on the date scanned, as 
shown by the date stamp.” Standing Order on Prisoner Electronic Filing Program, No. CTAO-
16-21, at 1. 
 331. Judicial Conference Approves Prisoner Case Filing and Judge Assistance Pilot 
Programs, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2016/09/13/judicial-
conference-approves-prisoner-case-filing-and-judge-assistance-pilot. 
 332. Id. 
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dedicated email address.”333 But, “[f]or security reasons, prisoner eFiling will 
allow inmates only to transmit documents to the court, not to view court 
documents or receive court communications.”334 
It is not all that surprising that these programs are starting with electronic 
programs for outgoing filings (by the inmate to the court), and that none of 
them provides for the inmate to receive electronic court notifications directly. 
Many inmates lack consistent access to the internet and to email. Some 
institutions, it appears, provide internet and email access as a reward for good 
conduct335—an arrangement that plainly would not provide a reliable means 
for inmates to receive direct electronic notice of docket entries. Most inmates 
likely have limited or no access to computers on which to draft their filings;336 
and though one manufacturer has found a niche market selling typewriters to 
inmates, such items are too expensive for many inmates.337 Thus, for the 
foreseeable future many inmate filings will likely be handwritten or, if not 
handwritten, typed. For the moment, it seems likely that electronic filing 
programs for inmates will thus differ in key ways from full participation in 
the CM/ECF system. 
                                                                                                                            
 333. Court Operations and Case Management—Annual Report 2016, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/court-operations-and-case-management-annual-
report-2016 (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). 
 334. Id. 
 335. See, e.g., Testing Concepts to Reduce Violence and Use of Restricted Housing, 
CORRECTIONAL NEWSFRONT, Oct.–Dec. 2016, at 86, 
http://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Newsroom/Documents/Newsfront/2016%20Newsfronts/2
016%20Correctional%20Newsfront%20-%20October%20to%20December%202016.pdf (“On 
May 1, 2016, SCI Smithfield began examining the use of a mobile kiosk and personal tablet 
devices as an incentive for good behavior for inmates housed in the restricted housing unit . . . .”). 
 336. At least one program may provide inmates with computer time for drafting court filings. 
A member of the Criminal Rules Committee reported in 2015 that there was a nascent pilot 
program involving collaboration with two institutions run by the state department of corrections. 
See MARCH 2015 MINUTES, supra note 318, at 19. The program “allow[s] prisoners to file 
electronically in Section 1983 cases,” though not in habeas proceedings. Prisoners receive 
allotments of time at computer stations where they can type their documents and file them—a 
development that the court appreciates because more than half its docket consists of prisoner 
cases, and the e-filing program “has cut down the many, many pages of hard to decipher 
handwriting.” Id. 
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D. National Rules that Accommodate Local and Institutional Variation 
The pilot programs described in the preceding section should fit 
comfortably with the pending amendments to the electronic filing rules. The 
national rules, as revised by the pending amendments, would permit courts 
to adopt court orders or local rules authorizing electronic filing by pro se 
litigants—so the programs noted above should qualify under those 
provisions. Moreover, the programs noted above apply only in civil cases, so 
they would not be in tension with the Criminal Rules Committee’s choice to 
avoid authorizing local requirements for electronic filing by pro se litigants. 
How will the developments noted in the preceding Part affect the time-of-
filing questions that I discussed in Part I.B? I will argue, here, that the type 
of prisoner electronic filing programs that are currently most prevalent in 
federal courts may bring Houston v. Lack back into service for filings by 
inmates—because the prison mailbox rule codified in the Appellate Rules is 
not a perfect fit for those e-filing programs. As for the problems that can arise 
with incoming prisoner mail, the e-filing programs might provide better 
assurance that notice of court orders will timely reach inmate litigants—but 
better still would be a system that allows inmates themselves to view 
electronic versions of the docket in their case, at least in civil cases.338 
                                                                                                                            
 338. Providing inmates with electronic access to the dockets in their criminal cases could 
raise more difficult issues. A concern would be that such access might facilitate efforts by some 
inmates to pressure other inmates to demonstrate that they had not cooperated with the 
government. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUNE 2017 STANDING 
COMMITTEE—DRAFT MINUTES 15 (2017) (noting that the Criminal Rules Committee 
“has . . . formed a Cooperator Subcommittee, which continues to explore possible rules 
amendments to mitigate the risks that access to information in case files poses to cooperating 
witnesses”), in COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, STANDING AGENDA BOOK (2018), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-01-standing-agenda-book.pdf. 
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Here it is useful to review the text of Appellate Rules 4(c)(1) and 
25(a)(2)(C). As they currently stand, those Rules are materially similar to one 
another, so I will quote Rule 4(c)(1): 
(1) If an institution has a system designed for legal mail, an 
inmate confined there must use that system to receive the benefit of 
this Rule 4(c)(1). If an inmate files a notice of appeal in either a civil 
or a criminal case, the notice is timely if it is deposited in the 
institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing 
and: 
(A) it is accompanied by: 
(i) a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746—or 
a notarized statement—setting out the date of deposit and stating 
that first-class postage is being prepaid; or 
(ii) evidence (such as a postmark or date stamp) showing 
that the notice was so deposited and that postage was prepaid; or 
(B) the court of appeals exercises its discretion to permit the later 
filing of a declaration or notarized statement that satisfies Rule 
4(c)(1)(A)(i).339 
Rule 25(a)(2)(C) tracks Rule 4(c)(1) very closely, except that instead of 
defining when “the notice [of appeal] is timely,” Rule 25(a)(2)(C) defines 
when “[a] paper filed by an inmate is timely.” (Notices of appeal are filed in 
the district court, whereas Rule 25(a)(2)(C) governs filings made by an 
inmate in the court of appeals.) 
Rules 4(c)(1) and 25(a)(2)(C) are designed for filings made in paper form 
and mailed from the facility in which the inmate is confined. It is hard to see 
how the terms of these Rules could be met by an electronic filing, given that 
“first-class postage” has no meaning in the electronic context. That, indeed, 
might be the reason why the pending amendment to Appellate Rule 
25(a)(2)(C) (which would be re-numbered Appellate Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(iii)) 
would revise the phrase “[a] paper filed by an inmate” to read “[a] paper not 
filed electronically by an inmate.” 
But though current Rules 4(c)(1) and 25(a)(2)(C) do not appear to govern 
the timeliness of electronic inmate filings—and the pending revision to Rule 
25(a)(2) would underscore that inapplicability—that should not mean that the 
prison mailbox rule has no relevance to inmate e-filings. Recall that, in almost 
all of the extant inmate e-filing programs, the inmate delivers a paper copy 
of the filing to prison staff, who scan and email the document to the court. 
What if a prison staffer misplaces the document, or scans only blank pages, 
                                                                                                                            
 339. FED. R. APP. P. 4(c)(1). 
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or emails the document to the wrong court? In any of those instances, the 
mishap would be out of the inmate’s control. In the words of the Fallen Court, 
the inmate would have “d[one] all he could under the circumstances.”340 For 
these filings, though the codified prison mailbox rule is inapplicable, courts 
should apply the underlying Houston rule to fill the gap. 
As a practical matter, prisoner e-filing programs might alleviate some of 
the difficulties associated with incoming prisoner mail. We saw in Part I.B.3 
that the codified prison mailbox rule does not cover incoming mail delays, 
and that courts have divided over whether to extend Houston to such delays. 
The delays themselves might be somewhat lessened by a system—such as 
some of those noted in Part III.C—that enlists prison staff to print 
electronically-conveyed court orders and notices and deliver them to the 
inmate. Whereas paper mail might be delayed in entering the prison because 
it must go through security screening, electronic notices and documents 
would encounter no such delay. Thus, the systems that feature institutional 
printing of court electronic notices could provide inmates more promptly with 
notice of court decisions in their cases. On the other hand, once the electronic 
notices are printed, the printed copies must make their way to the inmate 
litigant—and the reliability of that delivery depends on the institution’s 
internal practices. There thus may continue to be some instances in which the 
notice’s delivery is delayed due to circumstances outside the inmate’s 
control. If new prison programs find a way to allow inmates to view, for 
themselves, the electronic dockets in their cases, this could further alleviate 
the problems that might arise concerning incoming inmate mail. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As Part I recounted, the Appellate Rules advanced, in a number of ways, 
the goal of access to appellate justice for indigent and incarcerated litigants. 
Part II observed that, over the half-century of the Rules’ existence, the 
framework that they set has been overlaid in important ways both by circuit 
case management practices and by legislation. In Part III I predicted that, 
going forward, the procedures in inmate appeals will additionally vary 
depending on the institution in which an inmate is incarcerated and the extent 
to which that institution enters into technological partnerships with the courts. 
The developments in electronic filing show that the procedure for inmate 
appeals is subject not merely to local court variation but also to variation 
among correctional institutions. The process followed in an inmate’s appeal 
                                                                                                                            
 340. See Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 144 (1964); see also supra text accompanying 
note 117. 
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may vary over time depending on the institution(s) among which the inmate 
might be transferred. Crafting national rules to accommodate these 
complexities will present an ongoing challenge. 
Thus, while the rulemakers remain alert to the needs of inmate filers, the 
spirit and reasoning of the Fallen and Houston Courts will continue to be 
centrally important. To the extent that the specific inmate-filing provisions in 
the national sets of rules do not address electronically-submitted inmate 
filings, courts should consider adopting local rules to fill the gap,341 and, in 
the absence of such rules, should carry forward Houston’s reasoning when 
applying the rules’ filing provisions to materials submitted electronically by 
incarcerated litigants.342 
I would like to close by setting this article’s survey of appellate procedures 
in a broader context. Part II.B noted two central legislative changes—the 
PLRA and AEDPA—that have made it much harder for inmate litigants to 
succeed in bringing civil rights or habeas claims. This article does not address 
the wisdom of those changes, or assess the ways in which the applicable 
substantive and procedural doctrines erect barriers to relief for inmate 
litigants. Whether or not one agrees with the substantive judgments that 
Congress has made concerning inmate claims, all participants in the system 
should be able to agree on the basic value of access to appellate justice. An 
inmate should not lose the right to appellate review merely because he or she 
lacks the options available to a non-incarcerated litigant for timely filing a 
notice of appeal. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 341. See supra notes 328–30 and accompanying text. 
 342. See supra pp. 27–28. 
